EU-Russia: Unconventional summit

The recent EU-Russia summit was a disappointment for those who expected a tangible outcome, with no visible shifts likely for years in the dossiers discussed. For the Russians, it was the much-desired visa liberalization and for Europeans the compliance of the Russian energy sector with the 'third package', unbundling gas and pipelines.

Moreover, the traditional list of controversial issues was topped by the situation in Ukraine – the true ‘apple of discord’. The recent developments in the major transit country for Russian gas to the EU could not escape attention -  Presidents Barroso and van Rompuy discussed the issues tete à tete with Russian President Vladimir Putin (pictured),  abandoning the usual summit format.

In spite of the toxic volume of conflicting interests, an atypically emotional exchange of views  eclipsed the summit. The invitation by President Barroso to follow the wisdom of Dostoevsky in "not leaving things unsaid"  was accepted, to a certain extent by his two counterparts Putin and van Rompuy. Their frankness did not make us ‘happier', but removed the illusion of distance; politically, the gap between strategic patterns is quickly growing in inverse proportion to the growing volume of trade, characterized by President Putin as an indicator of EU-Russia rapprochement.

President’s Putin's huge loan offer to "the Ukrainian people", regardless of the government and reduction in gas prices appears to be a genuinely friendly gesture towards an economy drowning in foreign debt.  Apparently, Ukrainians are unable to pay even last year's bills to Gazprom, said Putin.

But real politics has limitations and many Ukrainians, especially the younger generation, are aspiring towards European integration in spite of the modesty of the EU's proposal, just the Association Agreement, with no candidacy status mentioned.  There are some explanations as to the lack of ambition on the part of the EU, which is considered by many as unfair as Turkey, which is definitely not a European country, enjoys candidacy status while Ukraine, which truly is a European nation, does not yet even come close.

The answer to this paradox might lie partly in the reluctance of the European agricultural economies of the south such as as France, Italy and Spain to welcome a fellow producer. On the other hand, Bulgaria and Romania's notorious corruption and immigration problems are not encouraging a new wave of eastern enlargement. And the huge foreign debt - around US$140 billion at the end of 2013 - accumulated under populist leadership since the time of the Orange Revolution does not make Ukraine an attractive prospective member of a club that is already carrying the burden of Greek debt and disarray.

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And the EU- Russia Summit did not answer the major question, namely how far both Russia and the EU are prepared to go in their ambition to integrate Ukraine. Meanwhile, the unrest in other towns following the violence in Kiev opens the way for broad speculation over the future of Ukraine as a nation state, throwing a long shadow of ‘Balkanization’ as a possible scenario.

Created after the 1917 October Revolution by Lenin in response to the profound desire of Ukrainians for independence, the country has undergone wide-ranging modifications in terms of its political identity and territorial enlargement throughout the 20^th century. Today, the weak central authority, preoccupied with its own power crisis, has less and less ability to maintain the unity of territories assembled in different political contexts.

Torn by the inner contradictions of multiple struggling interests of different ethnic and social groups and generations, political ambitions and economic realities, Ukraine is rapidly losing its recently created integrity, proclaiming the narrow interests of different regions and ethnic groups.

Next to major European and Russian factors there is also the US geopolitical situation, which has divided the county’s political elite between pro- and anti-American since the time of the Orange Revolution. Unlike Georgians, the Ukrainians rejected joining NATO as dominated by the US, but with the process of European integration the probability of a change in this outlook remains favourable, creating new divisions within the population that follow different political streams.

Although the pragmatism of President Putin’s loan proposals for Ukraine are not negligible for a country in economic turmoil, Russia's proposal of aid for the Ukrainians remains bleak, along with the perspectives of joining a Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.

The Russian ‘declining empire’ is unattractive with its outdated style of society - the seemingly everlasting regime of President Putin increasingly resembles Brezhnev’s stagnation, with his crusade against civil liberties and endemic Russian corruption, all earmarks of an authoritarian rule as a 'scarecrow' for the young Ukrainian nation. The ‘Putin factor’, in spite of his generosity in showering the Ukrainians with Russian taxpayers' money, cannot compete with EU accession in seducing Ukrainian citizens.

Europeans will not offer funds, but rather the reforms that are so desirable for a Ukrainian society that aspires to becoming a truly European nation.  However, this pro-European choice is not etched in stone either - there may be strong objections from traditional Russian-speaking provinces, who lost the official statuses of their own language after Ukraine gained independence following the collapse of the USSR. For them, Russia is not associated with President Putin's public image.

As a fan of Dostoyevsky, President Barroso should be able understand the profoundly emotional motives of the Russian-speakers' choice…

 

 

Anna van Densky

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