Klaus, Lisbon and Czech Power Politics
Sunday 01 November 2009By EU Reporter Correspondents
While the European Union waits for the Czech Constitutional Court's ruling on the latest batch of complaints about the Lisbon Treaty, it waits for the final piece of the puzzle to come into place before the ratification process can come to an end. It has been a long process and, perhaps unsurprisingly, one that devolved into a lot of political wrangling. The Czechs have put up the most persistent challenges to the Treaty but the Czech-Lisbon débâcle has been about more than the thing itself; it has been as much about domestic power politics as it has been about European level politics. And domestic Czech power politics, embodied by President Václav Klaus, have been instructive in the entire fiasco.
The Treaty has already made its way through both houses of the Czech Parliament and it has already been approved by the Czech Constitutional Court. As everyone knows, Václav Klaus just has to put his signature on it. As everyone knows, he has done his best to delay that eventuality. But that is all that he could have done; in a parliamentary system as in the Czech Republic, Klaus does not have the power to kill treaties or legislation that has successfully passed through Parliament. His role as President is largely ceremonial and executive power is limited through the very bi-cameral nature of the parliamentary system. Klaus can post-pone signing the Lisbon Treaty but once the Constitutional Court (again) rules its approval of the Treaty, he will have no further recourse and will have to sign. He has already told his Prime Minister, Jan Fischer, that he will indeed sign, upon a positive court ruling and a guaranteed opt-out from the EU; he has been granted the latter and now it is only a matter of time before he receives the former.
So what is all of this about? It is unsurprising that he should be the last one standing in the way of the ratification process. Klaus's Euroscepticism and anti-Lisbon attitude are as well known as they are derided. It is unfortunate that his main concerns, that the original goal of European integration from economic deregulation to a comprehensive system of harmonisation and homogenisation has been impacted by a nebulous and uncontrolled spill-over effect and that the EU's democratic deficit underpins its crisis of popular legitimacy, have been largely overshadowed by his nationalistic grandstanding on issues of sovereignty. It is unfortunate because his concerns are relevant to the European project, as it tries to come to terms with itself as a regional power and as an international player.
For if his attitude towards the Lisbon Treaty is indicative of his attitude towards Europe's role in the Czech Republic and the Czech Republic's role in Europe, then the manner in which he has chosen to tackle the issue is perhaps indicative of his attitude towards his own role in Czech politics. In a recent interview with the English language The Prague Post, ex-Prime Minister and fellow ODS member Mirek Topolánek stated that, "Klaus seeks disputable issues in the Constitution and is trying to change a parliamentary system into a semi-presidential system. This leaves me cold and is confusing for people in the Czech Republic..." Unlike his predecessor, Václav Havel, who truly embodied the ceremonial and symbolic role of president dictated by the constitution, Klaus seems unprepared to leave politics to other players.
His combative style, which played an important role in his relationship with Havel and in transition-era Czech politics, came to the fore again during the Czech EU presidency in the first half of the year. Just as the French tried, arguably, to steal the limelight by openly questioning Czech capacity to successfully helm the EU, Klaus tried to do the same at the domestic level. While it was actually then-Prime Minister Topolánek who was supposed to be running the show, many would be followed by appearances, given Klaus's prominence. It was Klaus who refused to fly the EU flag over Hrad?any and it was Klaus who everyone feared would sit on the presidency, rendering it as unproductive as possible. Topolánek? Who?
Ultimately, Klaus has lost little in the Lisbon débâcle. He will sign the Treaty, just as he was always going to have to. But with his opt-outs secured and his political masculinity intact, he can face the domestic political scene with a certain assurance that he can directly influence the game which he dislikes so much. Whether or not he is consciously attempting to change the foundations of the Czech political system, it seems clear that he is consciously attempting to change his position within it. Though he will obviously never hold the same cache for Czechs or for the international community as the other Václav, he has done a great deal to solidify his image as a vocal and active President. In a system where the presidential role is largely symbolic, this is not an unimportant development.
Although Klaus has angered and alienated many with his reluctance to sign the Lisbon Treaty, at both at home and abroad, he has demonstrated an ability to twist the rules of the game in his favour; without really having the power to do so, he dictated the Lisbon time-line and the debate surrounding it. He shifted the issue away from the players who were ultimately responsible for it and made it a visibly personal issue. Havel has said, in his recently published presidential memoirs To the Castle and Back, that Klaus's "self-centeredness always projected itself into his politics". The Lisbon débâcle has demonstrated much truth in that statement; but his self-centeredness on the issue has paid off and whether or not one agrees with his position and his actions, one must view them in the wider context of domestic and international power politics. Lisbon has never been simply about Lisbon, nor should it be. In a Europe that is on the verge of redefining the rules of the game, it is important to have dissonant voices such as Václav Klaus as a reminder that, even with a fixed-term President and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs, European politics continue to be intimately connected with domestic politics.