Sizing up Russian-NATO relations
Tuesday 30 June 2009By EU Reporter Correspondents
Needless to say, Russia-NATO relations have reached a crisis. Of course, relations between post-Soviet Russia and NATO were never really normal, and so we should take the term crisis with a grain of salt. Indeed, one might describe the current crisis as the new normal, a situation that reflects essential differences between the political and military visions and interests of each party. These differences become all the more clear when one considers Russia-NATO relations in strictly military terms, the way a military observer from Moscow might view them, writes Ruslan Pukhov, director of Moscow's Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.
NATO today: Russia’s view
The North-Atlantic pact was created as a military coalition directed exclusively against the USSR (Russia). NATO is a defensive alliance of Europe against Russia. NATO today, despite all the geopolitical shifts in Europe and the world, remains an anti-Russian military alliance and its main objective is the military defense of European countries (including the new member-states) against Russia – such is the raison d’être of the block. To stress the point, one can say that if there were no Russia there would be no NATO. This is fundamental to the Russian vision of NATO. From Moscow’s point of view, NATO’s transformation in the past decade and a half has not affected the essence of the alliance. There is no denying that NATO is trying to adjust to «modern trends» of contemporary military work such as the fight against terrorism, joint peacekeeping and stabilization operations, etc. Yet, let us ask ourselves a question – what is the purpose of these activities? Is the alliance not simply trying to adopt a new form for the coalition with the aim of continuing to pursue its essential function, that of deterring Russia? Russia simply cannot disregard this overarching mission, which stands behind the various tasks that NATO undertakes today.In military and political terms, NATO’s essence as an anti-Russian military coalition has a decisive impact on all the major military and political aspects of its activities – from military planning to the enlargement eastwards. NATO’s enlargement to the East pursues obvious objectives:1. To consolidate the geopolitical shifts in Europe which are favorable for the West; 2. To establish conditions that prevent the restoration of Russian influence in Eastern Europe in any form; 3. To push Russia’s actual frontiers and the zone of Russia’s military capabilities as far as possible from Western Europe; 4. To use the territories of new Eastern European NATO member-states as convenient bridgeheads to deploy forces against Russia, which would be capable of threatening vital centers on Russian territory.Ultimately, from Moscow’s perspective, it is quite evident that the Alliance’s objective «to keep the Russians out of Europe,» as formulated by NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay in 1956 continues to be the main strategic direction for NATO member-states vis-à-vis Russia. Only now, the border of «Europe» has been drawn up against Smolensk and Kursk.Finally, let us not forget about the dominant role of the USA within NATO. Without the USA, NATO basically cannot exist and fulfill its major mission. In military terms, the armed forces of the other NATO member-states constitute little more than supplementary detachments to the US military machine. In view of this, Moscow considers NATO as an instrument of American policy. That is why any engagement of Russia with NATO takes place in the shadow of Russian-American relations. As for Moscow’s stance towards the US, the emerging consensus in Russia is that the US will not tolerate Russian capability to exercise power independently, irrespective of who is in charge of the Kremlin. Therefore, US policy is viewed in Russia as inescapably subversive of Russian interests. NATO, for its part, is merely a tool for the anti-Russian policy of the United States.In summary, the contemporary Russian vision of NATO is deeply pessimistic, and there are no well-grounded incentives for increased cooperation with the Alliance.
The Eastern factor
The accession of the former Warsaw Pact Organization member-states into the Alliance, as well as the Baltic states, contributed greatly to the destabilization of NATO-Russia relations. All of these countries regard Russia as their traditional historic rival; for them, the chief value of NATO is to protect them against Russia. Moreover, the foreign policy of most Eastern European states seeks to weaken Russia and minimize its influence.The Eastern European ruling elites value their hypertrophied loyalty to the West and their location as a cordon sanitaire as a major political resource, and they make active use of it. They believe that maintaining tense relations with Russia wins them broader support in the West, and so they blatantly pursue a policy of exacerbating their relationship with Russia. Eastern European states are thus objectively interested in destabilizing the situation in Eastern Europe rather than in normalizing it; this fact has been confirmed by their recent policies. These countries are provoking endless crises in relations with Russia, and aspire to paralyze any cooperation between Russia and Western Europe.Thus, NATO’s enlargement to the East has in fact resulted in a significant rise in anti-Russian tendencies within the Alliance itself, and this constant pressure on the part of the new Eastern European members will prevent the Alliance from «forgetting» about its original anti-Russian mission. This is particularly clear from Moscow. Therefore, if leading Western NATO member-states want to put the NATO-Russia partnership back on track, they will have to choose between Russia and their new Eastern European allies. No doubt, this is one of the most important factors undermining NATO’s capacity to conduct an efficient dialogue with Moscow.
Ukraine and Georgia
Dragging Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance will further exacerbate NATO-Russia relations. From this perspective, the salient lesson of the August conflict in Georgia is that Russian public opinion was completely shocked by the fervent, anti-Russian reaction of the West to what happened, and by the readiness of Western countries to support and justify any and all anti-Russian actions, including direct and undisguised attack on peacekeeping zones and peacekeeping forces, the killing of Russian peacekeepers and Russian citizens. In effect, the West has denied Russia any right to self-defense in principle. This made an unexpectedly big impression on Russia, and deeply troubled Russian public opinion across the political spectrum. This resulted in a significant surge of anti-Western sentiment in Russia, and a massive rise of hostility towards military and political cooperation with the West, especially with the USA. The implications of this growth of anti-Western sentiment have not yet been fully appreciated.One should not forget that the basis for cooperation with the West in the security sphere (including within the framework of NATO) is based on the commonality of interests. For example, NATO allies are ready to delegate the resolution of defense issues to one another, providing a consensus can be reached, because they share common security interests. However, the conflict in Georgia demonstrated an almost complete absence of common interests between Russia and NATO members on security issues. But most importantly, it proved to Russian public opinion the fact that Russia cannot trust Western countries to resolve any of its national security problems, not even the most narrowly defined ones. This objective fact completely paralyzes any serious rapprochement between Russia and the West in the sphere of defense.Nor shall we dwell on the problem of Ukraine’s possible accession to NATO. It is perfectly clear that this issue is the equivalent of a nuclear bomb for Russian-Western relations. Attempts to drag in Ukraine into NATO would provoke a military and political crisis of tremendous scope, compared to which the Georgian conflict would seem a minor episode. Moreover, there is no doubt that Ukraine would face an acute internal political crisis due to the stark differences of culture and values among its own population, especially considering the strong pro-Russian mood in the Crimea. It would also be impossible for Russia to distance itself from an internal political crisis in Ukraine. On the other hand, the West seems to underestimate the importance of the Ukrainian issue for Russia, and shows a lack of understanding of Ukraine as an immense and imminently destabilizing factor in relations between the West and Russia. Illusions about Russia somehow being forced to «swallow» Ukraine’s accession to NATO could lead to catastrophe. It bears recalling that before August, the West never thought Russia would dare to intervene militarily in Georgia.
Points of coincidence between NATO and Russia
Russia and NATO undoubtedly share some common interests in the military sphere:1. Cooperation in the fight against international terrorism and piracy. 2. Cooperation in stabilizing Afghanistan. 3. Confidence-building measures, including the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).However, their significance should not be overestimated. Terrorism has been on the Russia-NATO agenda for some time now, but cooperation remains formalistic. Besides, for Russia, the major terrorist threat comes from Islamic extremists in the North Caucasus, while the US and other Western countries, frankly speaking, are not particularly interested in Russia’s complete victory over these elements. The West was frustrated by Russia’s victory in Chechnya, which it did not expect, and would have preferred if the North Caucasus would continue to create problems for the Kremlin.The US and NATO are far more interested than Russia in the stabilization of Afghanistan, as this country is not within Russia’s short-term political horizon. Frankly, the real question is whether Russia has an interest in a total victory of the Western Alliance in Afghanistan, or not. Finally, the CFE Treaty is gradually dying. The widespread view in Russia is that the West is using the CFE Treaty to weaken Russia’s military machine rather than to strike a balance of interests in the sphere of conventional weapons. NATO member states have completely ignored even the most moderate Russian requests to modify the CFE; namely, on flank limitations, the register of armaments of new member states, and so on. It is understandable that Western countries wish to maintain their freedom of action in the sphere of conventional weapons and simultaneously to limit it for Russia as much as possible. However, it is perfectly clear that such a stand would inevitably lead to destabilization of the Treaty and a crisis of the CFE. Western countries should first of all decide what role they wish the CFE to play vis-à-vis Russia – is it a Versailles-type treaty, or, roughly speaking, a Locarno-type? If it is a Versailles-type of treaty, then what hopes does NATO have in preserving an advantageous position for itself?
Russian force generation in the context of relations with the West
To understand the prospects for the development of Russia-NATO military relations more clearly, we should briefly touch upon the current Russian force generation and planning. Russia’s force generation, despite the adoption of numerous formal doctrines and concepts, is rather contradictory and spontaneous. This is due to the fact that after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation is still going through a crisis of statehood and national self-consciousness. The Russian nation and political elite have not yet achieved a consensus on national objectives, cultural values and a political course for the new Russia. That is why Russian state building is determined by a combination of old and new, by the simultaneous aspiration to preserve old values while modernizing, to be pro-Western and anti-Western at the same time. This presents an obstacle to the formation of clear objectives for the Russian armed forces, to the determination of the nature and scope of threats and range of its potential foes. To date, such determinations have been conducted in a haphazard manner, influenced by immediate threats, impulses and reflexes in reaction to specific challenges, threats and actions of the outer world. This situation has determined the state of Russian foreign and defense policy, as well as Russian strategic planning.That said, there has been a relative stabilization on this issue in recent years, the emergence of a national consensus with regard to the goals and objectives of Russian state building. Most Russians would like to see Russia as a great power, one of the centers of global power, neither a US satellite nor EU member-state, but a state with a truly independent foreign and defense policy. One could even define this consensus as «Russia’s restoration as a great power in economic, political, military, and, to the extent possible within the borders of the former USSR, territorial terms.» There is no need to state that these goals are in direct contradiction with the policy pursued by the US, NATO and European countries, which are, on the contrary, interested in greatest possible weakening of Russia in terms of its economy, politics and military. The last thing they wish to see is the «restoration of Empire.» There is a broad understanding that the respective visions of Russia and its future held by Russians themselves and the West are in profound opposition and conflict with one another. This is the main cause of the prevailing anti-Western sentiment in Russian society today. The USA and the West are increasingly perceived in Russia as major obstacles to national renewal and modernization. Hence, there is a growing perception of the US and its allies (primarily NATO allies) as foes. In spite of the opinion, widespread in the West, that this policy is consciously dictated by the Kremlin. However, it is quite clear to Russian experts that the Kremlin has opportunistically made use of this sentiment rather than create it.At the same time, Russia cannot ignore its broad ties with Western countries. Besides, it is no longer in a state of ideological confrontation with the West. Russia faces contemporary challenges like terrorism and separatism. Russia is also going back to the pursuit of a sort of «quasi-imperialistic» policy in the territories of the former USSR, interpreting it as its sphere of influence, and in this regard it is keen to avert security threats from the territories of former Soviet republics. Lastly, Moscow cannot disregard the rise of new powers on the world arena, primarily China.These factors combined compel Russia to pursue a multi-vector military build-up, preparing to repel a wide range of threats and simultaneously to avert all kinds of conflicts, be it counter-insurgency, intervention in former Soviet republics or a possible large-scale conventional land war with NATO or China, as well as global nuclear war with the United States. These multiple priorities put a large burden on the development of the Russian armed forces and defense planning, especially considering the vast territories of Russia and the length of its borders in the context of the current lack of resources.In these conditions, the baseline for the current Russian leadership in terms of force generation is to avert military confrontation with the West by way of preserving and developing powerful strategic nuclear forces, and as for conventional weapons, Moscow has limited the objectives of its armed forces to action in local conflicts, such as the recent Georgian conflict. The new phase of military reform set in motion by Defense Anatoly Serdyukov is intended to transform Russia’s conventional armed forces into mobile compact forces adapted to limited conflicts, thus abandoning the Soviet mass mobilization army. Moreover, the conventional armed forces will yet again be reduced. Thus, Russian military force generation clearly proves that Russia does not seek military confrontation with NATO, and that Russia does not in principle seek to threaten Western countries with its troops. Russia will quite simply be devoid of such troops. Thus, the Russian military threat for NATO member-states has practically vanished. This sends a far more objective and clear signal to the West than any political statements and declarations.
Perspectives and limits of cooperation with NATO
Today, the ball is in the Western court, not in the Russian. Moscow has no particular liking for NATO, nor does it intend to confront the Alliance. Russia simply does not set any negative objectives with regard to the USA or NATO. The foreign and defense policy of Russia is still far too reactive, not pro-active. It merely reacts to outside irritants, be it Georgia’s aggressive behavior, MD or NATO’s enlargement. In a nutshell, Russia wants to be left alone, its security not to be threatened and its sphere of influence to be respected.On the other hand, the USA and NATO are still deciding among three approaches to Russia:1. Deterrence. 2. Active pressure and expansion into the post-Soviet space. 3. Cooperation.Different groups of NATO members seem to have different preferences with respect to these approaches. It is clear though, on the whole, that NATO, and primarily the US, fear that giving up on the deterrence and active pressure policies could lead to an extraordinary enhancement of Russian power, the consolidation of its sphere of influence and Moscow’s transformation into a real center of world power. On the other hand, NATO is hopeful that further cooperation with Moscow will help to integrate it into Western institutions and weaken its aspiration to pursue an independent foreign and defense policy. There is no obvious choice for the West due to several reasons. As a result, both parties – Russia and NATO – continue to be guided by an internally contradictory policy towards each other in terms of their objectives, which makes these relations extremely dependent on subjective and momentary factors. Therefore, regular «ups and downs» in Russia-NATO relations are inevitable.To conclude, there are no objective near-term factors that could facilitate a real, rather than ritual, rapprochement between Russia and NATO in political terms. And the lack of any prospect for a political rapprochement makes the development of truly broad military ties highly unlikely.
Ruslan Pukhov is Director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) since 1997. In 1996 he graduated from the School of International Information of MGIMO University under the Russian Foreign Ministry. In 1996–1997 – postgraduate student of the French-Russian Master d’Etudes Internationales Sciences Po – MGIMO. In 1996–1997 – researcher for the Conventional Arms Project of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center). Since 2007 Member of the Public Advisory Board of the Russian Defense Ministry.
http://mdb.cast.ru/