Should the European Union use Central Asia in the sanctions fight against Russia?

At the end of June this year, the European Union adopted the 14th package of anti-Russian sanctions.

The EU Council notes that the new restrictions are aimed at "such expensive sectors of the Russian economy as energy, finance and trade" and "will make it even more difficult to circumvent EU restrictions."

At the same time, Brussels imposed export restrictions on 61 companies (some of them from China, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Kazakhstan and the UAE), which, according to the European Union, help Russia with the supply of dual-use goods and technologies.

It is clear that sanctions are the main tool of the West to limit the development of the Russian military complex, given that most of the weapons of the modern generation are built using radio components and semiconductors from Europe and Asia.

At the same time, there has been a sharp increase in traffic to Russia from neighbouring countries such as Kyrgyzstan in recent years. It is possible that part of the business in Kyrgyzstan is interested in making a profit, and some companies are registered by Russians themselves involved in the military business.

Nevertheless, experts from Central Asia say that further Western pressure on this region may have negative consequences for the Central Asian economies. In addition, of the five Central Asian states, there are those that do not avoid dialogue with the West, they themselves strictly observe the restrictions of the West.

As the Russian-Ukrainian conflict continues, the West itself is increasingly aware of the role of Central Asia in ensuring global energy security.

For example, Kazakhstan strictly follows the sanctions regime. This is evidenced by Astana's openness to dialogue with representatives of the West. For example, the EU Special Envoy for Sanctions, David O'Sullivan, often visits Kazakhstan, where he regularly and openly discusses sensitive aspects with Kazakh representatives.

Secondly, Kazakhstan, as well as all the countries of the region in general, continue to depend on the protracted confrontation between Western countries and Russia. The sanctions make their own adjustments to the current nature of cooperation between the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation, both on the C5+1 platform and in a bilateral format.

Sanctions have become serious new challenges for Central Asian countries due to the disruption of existing production and logistics chains, as well as the lack of direct access to the sea.

Speaking about Central Asia, we note that Kazakhstan is a strategically important partner of the United States and the EU in the region. It has been successfully cooperating with all major powers for many years.

Thus, Astana's efforts to develop a unified regional position of all Central Asian states are necessary to reduce the consequences of Washington's sanctions policy and the formation of "strategic autonomy" from the Russian Federation.

In turn, the United States and the European Union attach great importance to energy cooperation with Central Asia. In this regard, Washington and Brussels are using economic diversification as a geopolitical tool to distance Central Asian countries from Russia.

The main problematic aspect in relations with the United States at the moment is the diplomatic pressure of the American side on Kazakhstan, forced from the position of the State Department, to consistently involve the republic in the flowchart to contain the Russian Federation in the region and the world. In the end, excessive pressure on Kazakhstan may lead to Astana's drift towards Russia and China.

The big question is: do Europe and the United States need this?

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