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Who really decides in 2026 - Pakistan said no to the Yemen war in 2015

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In April 2015, when Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan for military support for its intervention in Yemen, Islamabad faced a dilemma that now seems almost prophetic: how far could its alliance with Riyadh go before it became participant in Riyadh’s wars? The question went before parliament and, after days of debate, elected lawmakers chose neutrality, judging that intervention could damage relations with neighbouring Iran and inflame dangerous Sunni-Shia tensions at home. Pakistan in 2015 was hardly a model liberal democracy; the military already exercised enormous influence over foreign policy and national security. That is precisely what makes the comparison with today so revealing. Even within that deeply flawed system, there remained enough institutional space for a decision about war to be publicly debated — and ultimately stopped by elected representatives. Pakistan could remain a close Saudi ally without assuming that Riyadh’s interests were automatically its own. Eleven years later, the Yemen question has returned. But the real question is whether the Pakistan that could say “no” still exists, writes Dimitra Staikou.

In 2026, the picture is radically different. The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey stipulates that an armed attack against one member will be treated as an attack against all three, while their military leaderships have already moved towards deeper intelligence-sharing, coordination and integration of military capabilities. As confrontation with the Houthis escalates, Pakistan has moved beyond diplomatic alignment towards tangible forms of military support, although no decision has yet been taken to deploy Pakistani forces directly into combat inside Yemen.

But that is precisely the crucial difference from 2015. Then, the question was posed clearly and publicly: would Pakistan join the war or not? Today, involvement can expand incrementally — through defence commitments, military coordination, advisers and material support — without an equivalent moment of parliamentary accountability in which elected representatives are asked to determine where the country’s red line lies. The most important change, therefore, is not simply Pakistan’s policy towards Yemen. It is who now possesses the real power to decide which wars belong to Pakistan — and which do not. Increasingly, that power lies with the military.

The paradox is that Pakistan is expanding its military commitments in the Middle East at precisely the moment when it is struggling to control the fronts it already has. In late September, it carried out fresh air strikes inside Afghanistan, as confrontation with the Taliban government and the threat from the TTP have turned the western frontier into an active theatre of conflict. To the east, the fragile de-escalation with India following the serious military confrontation of 2025 remains under strain: while the dispute over the Indus Waters Treaty remains unresolved.

Yet on October 5, Islamabad agreed with Turkey to the rapid deployment of military forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Pact, while Pakistani support for Riyadh’s operations against the Houthis has already moved beyond diplomatic solidarity to military equipment, advisers and operational assistance. A country conducting strikes across the Afghan border while managing an exceptionally fragile relationship with India is simultaneously choosing to expand its military obligations in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has obvious reasons to want Pakistani military power; it is far less obvious what vital Pakistani interest is served by gradual involvement in yet another war. Here, the comparison with 2015 becomes even more damning.

Then, parliament could distinguish the interests of a powerful ally from Pakistan’s own national interest. In 2026, by contrast, there is a danger that the ambitions of the military establishment — regional influence, strategic prestige and the army’s emergence as an indispensable security partner for the Gulf monarchies — are being presented as the interests of the country itself. But the interests of Pakistan’s generals are not, by definition, the interests of Pakistan. And when elected institutions no longer possess the same power to make that distinction, strategic overreach ceases to be merely bad foreign policy. It becomes a symptom of who really governs.

The consequences of this shift in power become even clearer when Pakistan looks towards Iran. Islamabad cannot afford to treat Tehran as simply another adversary: the two countries share a sensitive border. Besides, Pakistan has a substantial Shia population, making any regional Sunni-Shia confrontation potentially dangerous at home as well. Yet the deeper Pakistan is integrated into Saudi Arabia’s security architecture, the harder it becomes to maintain the balance Islamabad has traditionally sought between Riyadh and Tehran.

The contradiction became particularly visible on 2 October, when Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said Iran had proposed political engagement with the Houthis and that Pakistan would convey the proposal to its Saudi and Turkish partners. Islamabad therefore wants to present itself simultaneously as an interlocutor with Tehran and a military partner of Riyadh. But the more closely Rawalpindi ties Pakistan’s security to Saudi Arabia’s, the less convincing that dual role becomes. The question is not simply whether Pakistan can balance the two. It is whether the militarisation of its foreign policy is gradually destroying its ability to maintain that balance at all.

That is why, ultimately, the most important story is not in Yemen. It is inside Pakistan itself. In 2015, the Yemen crisis served as a test of a flawed but still functioning system of civilian restraint: Saudi Arabia requested military support, the request was publicly debated, and parliament concluded that joining the war did not serve the national interest. In 2026, the same test has returned to a country where the balance between civilian and military power has shifted dramatically. The problem is not that Pakistan no longer has a parliament, a government or elections. It is that the existence of democratic institutions does not necessarily mean that those institutions still determine the country’s most consequential strategic choices. Modern military dominance does not always require shuttering parliament or suspending the constitution; it can leave civilian institutions standing while relocating real power elsewhere. Under Asim Munir, that is the fundamental question Yemen raises: not whether Pakistan still has democratic institutions, but whether those institutions still have the power to constrain the generals.

2015 was no golden age of Pakistani democracy. That is precisely what makes the comparison so damning. Even then, in a state where the military already wielded enormous political power, there remained enough democratic space for parliament to consider a war and say “no.” Eleven years later, Pakistan once again confronts the question of Yemen — but as a different state. In 2015, parliament could tell Saudi Arabia that Pakistan would not fight its war. The question in 2026 is whether Pakistan’s elected institutions still possess the real power to tell their own generals the same thing.

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