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#NATO: Warsaw summit could be last chance

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NATOIn 2008, when Bucharest NATO summit rejected Georgia’s bid for NATO membership action plan European allies made a strategic mistake, writes Levan Bodzashvili. But it is not only about Georgia. It is about the whole European security architecture, which is under serious turbulence since then and especially since 2014 when Russia made annexation of Crimea and invaded Ukraine, writes Levan Bodzashvili.

Inaction, like any action has its reaction, but in most geopolitical cases it is done with counter-action not with inaction. And yes, this rejection was grave mistake and a classic example of how inactivity leads to forced measures like deterrence and reassurance in Eastern Europe. Whether these measures will help to restore balance yet to be seen.

Major reason for this inactivity, was undesirability of Western European countries to complete NATO expansion towards the East European borders with argument not to irritate Russia. Since, we all have been living under this “strategic patience”, which gave Europe nothing but a “strategic headache” and to Russia strategically important time.

Now, Russia is irritating the West, on a daily basis. With its menace, nuclear narrative and the overwhelming propaganda till the core of national politics in European countries, sparing no financial efforts. And that is a very logical outcome of steps, which were not taken by some European allies 8 years ago and even during the years after. If the West had taken those steps we would not be facing this irritation today.

These steps were:

  • Completion of NATO expansion in Balkans and South Caucasus by giving Georgia MAP at that time. This would have had put Russia to face reality, rather than use menacing narrative and made the West facing reality. Seems simple? Yes, it is. One may argue, that was due to existence of the so called frozen conflicts in Georgia, and that is an argument, but, without coping with existing conflicts in a decisive manner, you can not prevent its proliferation especially when causes of the conflicts lay into a single confronting source and that is Russia. And now, we have twice as many conflicts on the wider European soil.
  • Underestimation of Georgia’s geo-strategic importance. If you want to keep grizzly deterred you need to keep it remote or caged. Not having completed NATO expansion made Russia neither remote nor deterred. This completion had to be concluded by providing irreversibility of Georgia’s NATO accession both in terms of timing and coherence. And it has nothing to do with geography only. By giving to Georgia various development packages except of MAP allies neither stopped irritating Russia nor gave a clear message to Georgians itself, which led to creation of fruitful basis for successful Russian propaganda.
  • Lack of proper conditionality policy towards the aspirant. NATO should have conducted reforms strategy towards Georgia not on the basis of partnership but rather proclaimed goal of membership. That is to say, make a change through clear path of membership rather than making partnership through reforms as a precondition. That would make Georgia to faster conduct democratic reforms, including consolidating it, judicial and rule of law reforms in a systematic way as a rule of state management. This goes to defence system administration reform, including capability, compatibility and institutional structure.

The way ahead

From the coming July NATO summit in Warsaw, Georgia expects not much. That message has already been there at least since December 2015 NATO Ministerial, which for the first time stated, that for accession Georgia needs to get MAP first. That means, no politically correct speculations that Georgia already has all kinds of tools for membership can be effective to maintain strategic patience nationally. Moreover, in terms of coming general elections planned in October.

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At this stage NATO has at least a number of issues to deal with in Warsaw: increase of deterrence capabilities in Eastern EU borders, especially for Baltic States; to decide on more and regularly rotating presence in the Black Sea and most importantly deal with the 'free riding'. So far, only a few NATO members have met its criteria to spend 2% of GDP on defence. The question of Open Door may still remain open, as it’s been for last 10 years. That means, there is not place for any decision on Ukraine or Georgia for the next 2 years at least. Taken into consideration record high turbulence into the wider region, the Middle East, Russia will gain more leverage to not only irritate the West but rather to act more aggressively.

After all, the best way to deal with Russian provocative narrative of menace is to act speedily. That would be rare if not the only effective measure to tackle increasing trends of cold war rhetoric and speedy rearmament. The more delay the more trouble and recent years have proven that obviously not only in Georgia but in Ukraine as well. Do we need to see the same scenario in Baltic States, elsewhere? Definitely not.

Warsaw Summit and the US politics

Warsaw summit may be the last chance for strategic decisions. Recent decisions to enhance the US and NATO rotating presence in Eastern flank will be effective from next February. It is not a secret, that till February 2017 many things may change in light of coming US presidential elections. Even the US approach to NATO may change strategically before that. In this worst scenario NATO’s Warsaw summit brings ultimate possibility for irreversible decisions. Any kind of stepping back from increasing presence and reassurance in Eastern Europe and effective “open door” policy with clear avoidance of further inclusion of politically motivated technical tools (such as MAP after December Ministerial decision) would open doors for Russia’s active maneuvers for the next 2 years. It is either opening doors for Russia or opening doors for partners. The choice is existential for European security.

Levan Bodzashvili is Deputy National Security Advisor to the President of Georgia, a former diplomat and Deputy Minister for Foreign affairs of Georgia.

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