How the Trump II administration might reshuffle global order

In my first article I described how Kamala Harris lost the unlosable election. In the second article of this series, I dealt with the question of what kinds of changes we can expect in the US domestically during the Trump II presidency, writes Vidya S Sharma*, Ph.D.

In this article I wish to examine how the United States’ relations with other countries may be affected during the Trump II Administration, especially with Europe, the NATO allies, Japan, ASEAN, and Australia; and also its two main strategic competitors, Russia and China.

TRUMP II WILL BE DIFFERENT FROM TRUMP I

There are three main differences between Trump I and Trump II.

Unlike Trump I, Trump II knows how the Federal Government machinery and the legislatures work. Further, he knows most of the leaders of Europe. He has dealt with Putin, Modi, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un during his first term.

Second, Trump II knows a lot more people. Many more than Trump I ever did. This is why it has not been difficult for him to find people loyal to him and nominate them for various senior positions that require confirmation by the Senate. I give three examples:

President-elect Trump nominated Mike Gatez as his Attorney General despite the fact that he was under investigation by the Republican Party-controlled House Ethics Committee and in 2020 he was accused of sex trafficking and having sex with minors (though the FBI decided not to take it any further). Gatez withdrew himself from contention when it became clear to him that the Senate will never approve his nomination.

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Soon after Gatez’s withdrawal, Trump nominated Pam Bondi, former conservative firebrand Attorney General of Florida, an election denier who believed the Federal Department of Justice had been weaponised and was on a witch hunt against Trump. She defended Trump during his first impeachment trial and even flew to New York to offer Trump moral support during his trial in which he was found guilty of inflating the value of his properties and tax avoidance.

Trump recently nominated Kashyap Promod Patel as his FBI Director. He was chief of staff to the acting Defence Secretary during the Trump I administration. He is a lawyer by profession who has long railed against the so-called Deep State (see his book Government Gangsters) and has vowed to punish Trump’s enemies. Patel and a large number of elected GOP members have often described the FBI as a corrupt organization. The FBI and its Trump-appointed present director Christopher Wray fell out of Trump’s favour for raiding Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate in search of classified records removed from the White House.

The readers can make up their own minds whether such people are capable of discharging their duties dispassionately and competently.

Third, Trump II comes to power with a more extreme agenda, both domestically and internationally. Besides his economic policies (including mass deportation of illegal immigrants)

he also won a mandate to pursue the politics of vendetta against those individuals and institutions he perceived were active in witch-hunting him.

I mention the above facts to merely point out that this time Trump will have no advisers like Gen. John Kelly (White House chief of staff for Trump from 2017 to 2019) or Gen. Jim Mattis (Trump’s Defence Secretary from Jan 2017 to Feb 2019) who can offer Trump advice that is not to Trump’s liking and stand their ground for reasons of integrity.

This time Trump will be served by sycophants/acolytes/fierce loyalists who will be eager to do his bidding. Most of the people chosen have no political base of their own. This is why he has not offered any role for Nikki Haley in his administration.

He will feel less restrained or rather the elected GOP lawmakers both in the Lower House and Senate will be very reluctant to criticise him because they know it is Trump’s popularity that has enabled them to control both legislatures.

TO DEPRECATE TRUMP AS “TRANSACTIONAL” IS NOT FAIR

The word “transactional” has been pejoratively used when describing Trump’s style of dealing with other countries/leaders, ie, diplomacy.

This is not a fair criticism of Trump. The fact is all politics – whether within a family structure, domestic politics or between countries is transactional. It has been so since the Pharaohs of the First Dynasty.

What is different is that Trump tells his counterparts in other countries what he wants from them in return for a concession offered. He does not leave it to his advisers/ambassadors/ cabinet secretaries to negotiate with the country in question what the US would like them to do in return. Nor does Trump leave it to the imagination of ​a​ particular country’s leader(s) how they should repay for the concession given.

MARCO RUBIO AS FOREIGN SECRETARY

As far as Trump is concerned, Rubio is an ideal person for this role: He is hawkish toward China. He is hostile to Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran. He has never shown much interest in the plight of Palestinians. He is a strong backer of Israel and like many in the GOP looks at the Ukraine-Russia conflict as a territorial dispute. In other words, he does not look at the Russia-Ukraine war from the viewpoint of Domino Theory (favoured by Biden and Zelensky and proven wrong with the collapse of South Vietnam and again in Afghanistan).

BIDEN LEAVES A MORE UNSTABLE WORLD TO TRUMP THAN HE INHERITED

Biden leaves a more dangerous world than the one he inherited in 2020. The Biden Administration has made several foreign policy blunders. I mention three of them briefly: To begin with, the US is involved in two wars: (a) the Israel-Gaza war in the Middle East where under Biden the US has played the roles of both arsonist and firefighter, ie, supplying all the armaments, weapon systems and bombs that Israel requested without having any influence on how Israeli Government conducts the war and simultaneously making weak token efforts to supply humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza; and (b) the Ukraine-Russia War which is going Russia’s way. Biden’s policy towards Russia has forced the latter to seek much closer cooperation with China, North Korea and Iran thus rendering Eastern Europe, North Asia and the Middle East more unstable. This has also weakened the US’s ability to deal with China in the long term.

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

These are anxious times for Ukraine. Most Ukrainians look at Trump with suspicion because of his well-known doubts about funding Ukraine’s war with Russia. To put it very simply for Russia it has been an existential conflict and for Ukraine a war of choice.

President Zelensky must be cursing himself for why under pressure from Biden he decided not to sign the peace treaty (commonly called Istanbul communique) that was brokered by Türkiye in April 22. The terms of any deal that Ukraine signs now will be worse than what the Istanbul Communique offered because with every passing day Ukraine is losing more territory.

The Istanbul communique called for the two sides to seek to peacefully resolve their dispute over Crimea during the next 15 years. Now it is almost certain that Ukraine will have to permanently cede Crimea (which never belonged to Ukraine until Brezhnev gifted it to Ukraine on 19 February 1954) to Russia and probably most of the oblasts (administrative districts) that comprise Eastern Ukraine. Eastern Ukraine is mostly populated by Russian-speaking Ukrainians and is the industrialised part of Ukraine. Even after the peace treaty has been signed, Ukraine will have to learn to live with an infuriated Russia.

Zelensky and the Ukrainian political elite may blame Trump for imposing a peace treaty that they may think is against Ukraine’s national interests but the fact remains if Biden or Kamala Harris had won the 2024 US Presidential election and continued to fund Ukraine’s war efforts, Ukraine would have ended up losing more men and territory.

In his last (farewell) speech to the UN General Assembly, Biden called for Israel to enter into peace negotiations with Palestinians but asked the world to keep fighting against Russia.

Biden’s speech was an example of brutal realpolitik. It is not in the interests of the US to be involved in a war in the Middle East. Hence the call for peace. But the US has an interest in “weakening Russia to the point where it can’t do the things it has been doing”, to quote US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin. Is there a smarter way of achieving this goal than finding a mercenary political elite willing to sacrifice the lives of its ill-trained countrymen on the battlefield for a few billion dollars?

Trump may be many things but he is not stupid. As part of any deal he brokers between Ukraine and Russia, he will ensure the sovereignty and security of the geographical areas that Ukraine controls is guaranteed. Maybe not by the NATO formally but by individual members of the NATO. Putin may be willing to make that concession as long as Ukraine promises not to arm herself, promises not to develop/possess nuclear weapons and remains militarily neutral by abandoning its bid to join NATO or signing a defence treaty that could threaten Russia’s security.

To put it very simply for Russia it has been an existential conflict and for Ukraine a war of choice.

Of course, Cold War warriors who still populate the US Foreign Affairs Department and a many think tanks may not like a peace deal that accepts that Russia has legitimate concerns about its security on the eastern border. Such people will see any peace deal that does not amount to total capitulation and humiliation of Russia as Trump kowtowing to the Russian dictator.

The end of war in Ukraine will give space and time to the US to weaken/loosen the relationship between Russia and China. Russia knows it can never hope to be an equal partner in its relations with China. It has been forced to accept the role of a junior partner because its primary priority right now is not to be encircled by NATO on its Eastern front. It has not forgotten both Napoléon Bonaparte and Hitler invaded Russia from the East.

In light of changed international environment, Ukraine’s President Zelensky has suggested ending the ‘hot phase’ of war in exchange for NATO membership without occupied territories. This may be in his opening gambit because Russia, under Putin or any other leader, will never allow Ukraine to join NATO.

Instead of listening to the kind of advisers who advised Ukraine to reject the peace deal brokered by Türkiye in April 22, Ukraine must think what is in its best interests, ie, realise that Russia is following a strategy of attrition that is gradually exhausting its armed forces, depleting American military stocks, doing so much damage to Ukraine’s infrastructure that its reconstruction cost will send the EU broke. Above all the West cannot fix Ukraine’s manpower and low morality problems unless NATO is prepared to put its soldiers on the ground.

There is no stalemate. The war is going Russia’s way. Consequently, Ukraine must aim for a negotiated settlement that protects its security, minimizes the risks of further Russian invasion and thus promotes stability in the region.

CHINA

From Trump’s viewpoint, China is the biggest threat: it has been responsible for hollowing out the manufacturing sector in the US, thus reducing the midwest US to a rust belt. As the Figure 2 below shows China has not made any direct investments in the US. What Trump has not said but it is very well documented that of all adversaries of the US, China has been most active in industrial espionage (including chip manufacturing and Artificial intelligence) and stealing military technology (as I have pointed out before).

When it has attempted to invest in the US (also in Europe) it has tried to take over entities that will give it an industrial or military edge over its rivals in the West and make it more self-sufficient technologically. This has been true even for its attempt to buy a seemingly benign dating app, Grindr in the US.

In 2016, Beijing Kunlun Tech bought 60 per cent of Grindr (a gay dating app) and completed the takeover in early 2018. After the transaction had gone through, the US Government woke to the fact that Grindr may have profiles of many closet gays who may be in senior positions within the US Government or in one of the thousands of military contracting companies. These people could be susceptible to blackmail and thus pose a threat to US national security. Consequently, in 2019, Beijing Kunlun Tech was forced to divest Gridr.

In other words, it may have taken decades for the US policymakers to realise that China was America’s most potent adversary but China, ever since it hoodwinked a foreign policy novice Bill Clinton to support China’s membership to the World Trading Organisation on the grounds that it was a market-based economy, has known its main rival was the US.

Trump seems to mainly talk about China only in terms of economic threat, eg, China runs the biggest trade surplus against the US, taking away American jobs by flooding US markets with Chinese cheap imports, etc. For him, putting tariffs on Chinese imports is a negotiating tool/tactic so that he can negotiate a more balanced trade outcome with China.

President-elect Trump has a mandate to impose 60% to 100% tariffs on Chinese products. To further put pressure on China, at the same time, he is asking American businesses to either bring their Chinese production home or friend-shore to countries not likely to threaten the US strategically (eg, countries in Central and South America). This may turn out to be a good strategy in the long run as more job opportunities in those countries will mean fewer illegal immigrants to the US.

Biden followed Trump’s policy on China. He went further by banning exports of some AI chips and machinery used in semiconductor industry to China. Biden did so because, in addition to seeing China as an economic threat he also saw China — unlike Trump but like many of Trump’s advisers — as an adversary that must be countered and undermined. We do not yet know how President Trump will act when the chips are down (no pun intended), for example, if China decides to integrate Taiwan into China by force.

HUAWEI

To curb the dominance of China in the telecommunications industry, the Biden Administration disqualified Huawei from tendering for G5 networks. The Biden Administration also cancelled licences of various US semiconductor and other companies from selling their chips and other products to Huawei in the hope that it would stunt the growth of Huawei for many years to come.

However, Huawei is a perfect example of how tariffs will not work to check China’s dominance in such technologies as AI, semiconductors, electric vehicles (Trump is expected to impose 100% duty on them), solar power, quantum computing, robotics, etc.

Huawei, instead of withering and shrinking, is a bigger, more diversified, more vertically integrated and more profitable company today.

Last year, Huawei’s sales were about $US100 billion, ie, roughly twice as much as of Oracle. It is about half the size of Samsung yet spends twice more on R & D. Its annual R&D budget of $US23 billion is only exceeded by Alphabet (the parent of Google), Amazon, Apple and Microsoft.

Last year it made about $US12.3 billion in profit which is considerably more than that of Ericsson and Nokia. The latter two are shedding staff while Huawei is hiring people. It now has 12,000 more workers than it did in 2021.

Recently Huawei released its Mate 70 smartphone, featuring HarmonyOS Next, its fully homegrown operating system, which rivals Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android. The launch signals China’s growing technological independence.

One of the things that is helping China is the fact it has been stealing technologies in all fields – whether they are government entities or private companies or research institutions and universities – for a very long time.

NORTH KOREA

After the failed 2019 Hanoi summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un, the latter seems to have decided that the rapprochement with the United States was not possible in the near future. In the intervening 4-5 years, the North Korean population may have become more impoverished but the country has become militarily more powerful.

The Ukraine-Russia War has been beneficial to North Korea in two respects: It has brought Russia closer to China and North Korea. China was never interested in helping the US in its aim of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. For the simple reason that a nuclear satellite state of North Korea makes China more secure. It can be relied on to ramp up tension in case of skirmishes/war in the Taiwan Straits. If there were good relations between Russia and the US, the former may be more amenable to putting some pressure on North Korea to help the US achieve its strategic goals in North Asia.

The continuation of the Ukraine-Russia War has meant that Russia has been forced to seek the assistance of North Korea at two levels: supply of trained soldiers and ammunition: missiles, shells, and torpedoes. In return for this assistance, North Korea would have surely negotiated transfer of inter-continental ballistic missile and satellite technologies. And maybe some aid in the form of food, petrol and gas.

In short, Trump will find North Korea a tougher nut to crack this time around. It is possible if North Korea does not provoke Trump by testing his weapon systems, Trump may not worry about North Korea and leave it for the next administration to tackle Kim Jong-un.

JAPAN

As Figure 1 below shows Japan is one of the countries that runs a big trade surplus with the US. Because Trump is obsessed with countries running a trade surplus with the US, this would normally mean that the US-Japan relationship is for rocky times ahead. But it may not be so.

There are many reasons for this. The way Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managed his relationship with Trump during his first administration was the envy of all allies and adversaries. The present Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has served in Shinzo Abe’s cabinet off and on. So Ishiba must know all about it.

Nevertheless, of all the allies, Japan has the least to worry about from Trump II. Shinzo Abe treated Trump with respect due to Japan’s most important trading and security partner and never made pejorative comments about Trump (unlike Justin Trudeau and Boris Johnson).

Further, as Figure 2 below shows Japan’s direct investment in the US has been growing consistently and by 2021 (the latest figures available from the Japan Trade External Organisation (JETRO), Japan was the largest investor in the US.

According to JETRO report cited above, Japan was the largest investor in 39 of 50 states of the US. In 2020, Japanese companies employed total of 931,900 Americans (an all-time record). Of these, 534,100 were employed in manufacturing (the sector Trump is very keen to revive). This was an increase of 84.6% since 2010, or 244,700 more employees.

Though Ishiba Shigeru (a long-time rival of Shinzo Abe) does not enjoy the same standing either domestically or internationally as was enjoyed by Shinzo Abe. In the Koizumi cabinet Ishiba was Director-General of the Defence Agency. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq by an American-led coalition, Ishiba saw the first overseas deployment of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces without a UN mandate amid strong protests by the Japanese population. From 2007 to 2008 he served as Defence Minister in Fukuda’s cabinet.

Ishiba Shigeru’s position is weak within his own party and also has a low popularity rating amongst Japanese voters. But he is very aware of the neighbourhood Japan is situated in. He has promised to increase Japan’s defence budget.

Three of the four main adversaries of the US, namely, China, North Korea and Russia, are Japan’s neighbours. Further, Japan has sovereignty over a large part of the Nansei Islands chain, literally the south-western islands, also called, the Ryū-Kyū archipelago, that constrains Chinese power projection into the Pacific.

In other words, since the last time Trump was in power and because increased tensions between the US and China, and the US and North Korea, the strategic value of having a good relationship with Japan and maintaining US bases on Japanese soil has only increased.

Ishiba Shigeru will attempt to make QUAD alliance more meaningful (having more teeth) by inviting the other three participants (India, Australia and the US) to deepen their security commitment to each other. Australia, because of its budget constraints and smaller size of the economy may try to persuade the other two members of AUKUS (ie, Britain and the US) that Japan should be invited to join AUKUS to make it JAUKUS.

Ishiba recently called for NATO to extend its charter to include the security of the western Pacific. It is not a new idea but in today’s environment where the US is not sure how it should divide its attention between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, is a non-starter.

Nevertheless, all the factors discussed above will ensure Japan has a good and productive relationship with the Trump II administration.

EUROPE, GERMANY AND THE NATO

Amongst the allies, Europe is the biggest casualty of Trump’s victory. This is because of

1. Trade wars with the EU that Trump wishes to re-launch;
2. His stated policy of not funding the ongoing Ukraine’s war with Russia (instead Trump aims to persuade Ukraine to settle its differences with Russia);
3. His indifferent attitude towards NATO; and
4. He is a Climate Change denier.

At least, this time the EU seems to be well prepared for two of the four issues mentioned above. Fearing Trump’s victory, the EU under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen has been quietly working on its responses to Trump’s tariffs.

In his first meeting of NATO leaders, Trump harangued the European members of NATO and called them deadbeats and free riders on American power. The reason for his outburst was that

in 2014 NATO members had committed themselves to meeting 2% of GDP guideline (agreed upon in 2006) but not many were meeting the target. Trump’s contempt for NATO is well documented.

At present, NATO has 32 member countries (including two new members: Finland and Sweden). In 2024, 23 members are expected to meet or exceed the target of investing at least 2% of GDP in defence, compared to only three Allies in 2014.

However, the Ukraine-Russia war has demonstrated that Europe needs to be more independent and capable of defending its own backyard. US interest in Europe’s defence will only fade as it concentrates on containing China. This will require deploying more resources to the Indo-Pacific and South Pacific regions. This, in turn, will mean the US will need to increase its defence expenditure (which has been flat during the Biden years).

From their previous dealings with Trump, the EU leaders know that more than anything Trump hankers for respect and flattery. He also prefers strong leaders. These may have been factors in choosing former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte as NATO’s secretary-general who got along well with Trump during his first term.

The Trump II presidency has come at a particularly difficult time for Germany. The latter is politically unstable: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently sacked his Finance Minister Christian Lindner, collapsing the traffic light coalition government. Germany, the biggest economy in Europe, not only needs to spend more on defence but must spend vast amounts of funds in modernising its infrastructure and economy. It must do so and also meet its welfare commitments to its citizens and immigrant population without breaching the debt guidelines superimposed by the EU. Further, soon after the war ends in Ukraine, the latter will need a staggering amount of funds for reconstruction. The US will expect the EU (read Germany) to fund these reconstruction needs.

PARIS CLIMATE ACCORD

Just as during his first term, we can expect the US to pull out of his the Paris Climate Accord. Both Trump and his nominated Energy Secretary, Chris Wright, have often called Climate Change as a “hoax”.

Last time when Trump pulled out of it, other countries did not follow his lead. Now the world population is even more educated about the perils of global warming. Domestically, Trump has indicated his desire to fully repeal Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act. I doubt if he will succeed in his aim because the electorates of many GOP representatives in the Lower House benefit from various projects funded or subsidised by this Act. However, we can expect a partial dismantling of this Act.

Besides the funds allocated under the Inflation Reduction Act, this time Trump will come up against at least three hurdles: (a) renewable energy, especially solar power, is a lot cheaper than electricity produced by fossil fuels; (b) Elon Musk, one of Trump’s backers, has made his fortune by selling electric vehicles (though solely not reliant on them now). It means we can expect fiery debates in White House’s Cabinet Room on this topic; (c) the hurricanes pounding the US coastal areas and hinterland now are not only more frequent but are also bigger and more powerful. Consequently, we can expect insurance and reinsurance companies to lobby the Trump Administration not to undo Biden’s initiatives on Climate Change.

ASEAN AND INDO-PACIFIC REGION

Trump does not like big countries (= economies) and or tightly knit groups of countries (eg, the European Union). Because he cannot pressure (or bully) them easily to accept the deal he may be offering them. Such counties/entities have retaliatory power.

The members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) pose no such threat to Trump. These are all geographically small countries. Collectively the ASEAN countries chalked a trade surplus against the US of about $200 billion in 2022. Vietnam and Thailand run the biggest trade surpluses.

Peter Navarro, a fiercely loyal former aide and now nominated to be senior counsellor for trade and manufacturing, would not have much trouble in getting a trade deal with ASEAN countries that satisfies President Trump’s trade agenda.

However, President Trump’s obsession with tariffs and trade deficits has the potential to complicate his dealings with China. Especially so this time when the Trump II Administration is going to be more hawkish, more prone to riding roughshod over alliances which Trump may think have less strategic value.

China is the biggest trading partner of each of the ten ASEAN countries. Trump II would not want China to have more influence on their foreign policies than it already has. Besides The Philippines (with which the US has an Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement), Trump II will need to develop strong security ties (informal or formal) with the ASEAN countries to effectively contain China. This may ultimately require Europe and NATO to take greater responsibility for their security. Or to use Trump’s language they need to pay for their own defence and not solely be dependent on the US.

Most countries in South-East Asia prefer a peaceful Asia and would not like to see a multilateral alliance similar to NATO but would not oppose mini-lateral arrangements developed with specific aims like QUAD, AUKUS, the security pact between the US and The Philippines, etc.

Nevertheless, when dealing with South East Asian countries, the US will need to be careful as many countries in the region have border disputes with their neighbours. China has landline or maritime borders with 16 countries. And it has border dispute with all of its neighbours (except Russia which it resolved very recently).

Every year, Sydney-based Lowy Institute revises one of its tools, the Asia Power Index. The purpose of this index is to monitor soft and hard power and power projection capabilities of the countries in the region and interests in this region. The latest edition of the Index reveals that the Indo-Pacific is dominated by two powers: the US and China.

The countries in the region know China’s ambition to dominate Asia, ie, be a hegemonistic power in Asia. It is also evident from its New Security Concept or doctrine. During the Trump I Administration, this development led to the upgrading of security arrangements between the US and The Philippines. For the same reason we have seen a tilt towards Washington in the foreign policy posture of Vietnam. Conversely, Cambodia is moving closer to China.

If these countries become more concerned about China’s behaviour, then the ASEAN countries will be forced to choose between the following two options: either develop specific goal oriented minilateral alliances similar to QUAD with the US or form a collective defence architecture similar to NATO or what has been called “Asian NATO” by Japanese PM Ishiba Shigeru.

None of the ten countries of ASEAN are comfortable with an open confrontation with China. Consequently, we can envisage more minilateral alliances like QUAD sprouting up in this region.

TAIWAN

When Trump talks about Taiwan he mostly mentions the following two things: (a) how Taiwan does not pay for its own defence; and (b) how Taiwan has destroyed America’s semiconductor (chip) industry. In 2022 in an interview on CBS 60 Minutes, Biden explicitly said that the US will come to aid of Taiwan if it were attacked by China. Will Trump II do the same when he is advised that the US may not win the war and may lose a very considerable amount of its military assets?

ISRAEL, PALESTINIANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Both Trump and Marco Rubio are strong backers of Israel, more particularly of Benjamin Netanyahu. So we can expect even harsher treatment of Palestinians living either in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, the establishment of many more Jewish settlements and the realisation of Netanyahu’s dream of greater Israel that incorporates both the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

If Netanyahu succeeds in his revanchist aims then despite wielding absolute power Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince) and the Emirs of the Gulf states would find it very difficult to sign on the Abraham Accord. In short, the Middle East will continue to be unstable and ripe for diplomatic exploitation by Russia and China.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)

The strength of Trump’s backing for Israel, especially for Netanyahu, can be judged by this episode. Recently, the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his ex- Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. Trump and many of his supporters have stated that they will sanction any country that acts on ICC’s warrants. They have also said they will stop funding NATO if any of its members acted on the ICC’s warrants. In other words, the US is willing to render irrelevant and destroy the ICC to protect Netanyahu. So much for the rule-based order.

UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION (UNO)

As during his first term, the UN can expect to be harangued by the Trump II administration. He has nominated Elise Stefanik to be the United States’ ambassador to the UN. Stefanik is a longtime critic of the UN. She has accused the U.N. of antisemitism for criticizing Israel’s settlements in the West Bank, and in October, 24, she called for the “complete reassessment of U.S. funding of the United Nations.” Stefanik started her political career as a mainstream Republican but now has become a Trump acolyte. She joined the movement that tried to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election.

INDIA

India’s manufacturing sector is one of the most protected in the world. According to the latest data available in fiscal 2023-24, Indo-US trade amounted to $120 billion with India notching a surplus of $35.3 billion.

But on the trade front, it may not be all bad news for India. It is a democratic country and mostly subscribes to the West’s worldview, therefore, it is very likely that just like during the Trump I, US companies winding up their production hubs in China may friend-shore them in India. India is considered a fast-growing economy. So this will also make India an attractive destination.

India and most other countries in South Asia and South-East Asia prefer a peaceful Asia. India, following a long established policy formulated by Nehru at the beginning of the Cold War in the early 1950s, will never be a part of an alliance system like NATO in Europe but would not oppose mini-lateral arrangements catering for specific aims like QUAD, AUKUS, the security pact between the US and The Philippines, etc.

During Trump’s first term, Indo-US relationship continued to develop and the trend will continue. The bilateral relationship has its own momentum but is also spurred by two more factors: (a) the strategic competition between the US and China (about containing China, Trump can never accuse India of not doing the heavy lifting as he does with NATO); and (b) India would not want Russia to develop closer ties with China as India’s expense (something which is also in the interest of the US).

Given Trump’s obsession with immigrants, it is possible that Indian citizens working temporarily could be an area of tension between the two countries.

AUSTRALIA, AUKUS AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES

Australia runs a large trade deficit with the US, ie Australia imports more than it exports to the US. It also has a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US. One would hope these two facts will protect Australia from Trump’s tariffs.

Still, Australia could be affected indirectly as a result of trade war between China and the US. The Australian economy could be adversely affected by higher inflation, higher interest rates, volatile economic growth in the US, stronger US $ and any slow down in China.

About one-fifth of Australia’s exports to China are re-exported to other countries. Among advanced economies, Australia has a higher exposure to Chinese domestic demand. A slowdown in China would also likely negatively impact Australia because it would mean lower commodity prices.

It is highly likely that AUKUS arrangement will enjoy the support of incoming Trump II administration, especially for three reasons: it is specifically aimed at China; it is a mini-lateral initiative like QUAD and the alliance with The Philippines; and Australia is investing in US naval shipyards to increase their productivity.

Australia and the US, with Fiji’s active support, will continue to counter the influence of China amongst the South Pacific Island countries. However, Australia and the US may have some difficulty in persuading New Zealand to be an active participant in this venture rather than being a spectator.

CONCLUSION

Despite often using undiplomatic expressions, Trump, during his first term, was an effective foreign policy president who was interested in the big picture or a helicopter view of the word instead of micromanaging foreign policy. Since Jimmy Carter, Trump was the first president who did not lead the US into a new war. He realised that China’s rise threatens the US’s prosperity and its traditional role in world affairs, something that was amply evident even during the first term of Obama Presidency but Obama failed to take any remedial action. It is to Biden’s credit that not only he followed Trump’s policies towards China but further strengthened them.

Trump has won power again when the world is very different from what it was during his first term. China is more powerful militarily. It has stronger ties with all of US’s adversaries: Russia, North Korea, and Iran. The US’s balance sheet has further weakened (which will, unfortunately, will weaken further under the Trump II). With borrowed money, it is funding two wars: one in Ukraine and the other one in the Middle East.

Trump’s victory means a reshuffling of the global order. He comes to power with a mandate to find a negotiated settlement to Ukraine-Russia war and contain and undermine China. We can expect change in the US’s attitude towards NATO. In other words, European countries must take greater responsibility for their security so that the US can concentrate on the Indo-Pacific and South-Pacific regions. Under Trump’s second administration, India, Japan and Australia may be encouraged to project their soft and hard power to contain China. Trump II will also need to take some meaningful initiatives to loosen the knot that ties Russia and China presently. In return Russia may have to promise not to transfer advanced military technology to China.

*Vidya S. Sharma advises clients on country and geopolitical risks and technology-based joint ventures. He has contributed many articles for such prestigious newspapers as: EU Reporter, The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age (Melbourne), The Australian Financial Review, East Asia Forum, The Economic Times (India), The Business Standard (India), The Business Line (Chennai, India), The Hindustan Times (India), The Financial Express (India), The Daily Caller (US). He can be contacted at: [email protected].

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