Addressing Russia’s malign influence

Many had sounded the alarm about Russia’s dangerous influence across the globe long before Putin’s regime launched its brutal invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Yet, at the time, those warnings were largely dismissed. However, in the wake of Russia’s full-scale assault, it has become clear that addressing this malign influence is imperative – what unfolded in Ukraine could easily spread to other nations, write Dr Helena Ivanov, based in Belgrade, Serbia is an LSE academic and Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, and Mykola Kuzmin of the Henry Jackson Society.

Many had hoped that, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the unprecedented sanctions, Russia’s capacity to wage its hybrid warfare across the globe would be curtailed. However, as demonstrated by the latest COP29 summit, Russia’s influence and ability to interfere remain very much intact. This became apparent in the lead-up to COP29, where Russian obstruction initially risked derailing the selection of the host country, since “Russia blocked the selection of every country that condemned its invasion of Ukraine”. What is more, it was Russia that in the end “brokered a deal that would see Azerbaijan return 32 Armenian prisoners of war and Armenia drop its opposition to Azerbaijan’s COP29 host bid”.

While the full extent of Russia’s interference remains challenging to quantify, its effects are undeniable: shifts in public sentiment and even political outcomes. Despite the concerted efforts to counter it, Russia’s capacity to wage hybrid warfare persists unchecked. The Kremlin continues to exert influence over autocratic leaders, destabilising countries across the region. In some instances, Russia has successfully manipulated autocratic leaders to erode democratic institutions; in others, public opinion, shaped by Russian propaganda, compels leaders to align with Moscow’s interests.

Through these tactics, Russia sows instability in its neighbourhood while tightening its grip over its sphere of influence.

This is especially evident in Moldova, Georgia, and Serbia, where Russian tactics are intensified by each nation’s unique historical context. In Moldova and Georgia, Russia seized de facto control over parts of their territories through military aggression.

In Moldova, it oversees Transnistria (around 12% of the territory), and in Georgia, it occupies Abkhazia and South Ossetia (20% of the territory). In Georgia, Russia justified its actions by alleging genocide against Russian populations – same as in Ukraine following its full-scale aggression in 2022. In Moldova, however, Russia claimed its presence was needed to protect post-Soviet weapons depots and to act as a peacekeeping force. In both Moldova and Georgia, regions holding substantial Russian-speaking populations became focal points for disinformation.

In Serbia, Russia’s stance on Kosovo – where it refuses to recognise Kosovo’s independence – combined with longstanding perceptions of Russian support since the 1990s, has significantly influenced Serbian views towards Russia. Research indicates that a majority of Serbs would prefer to align with Russia over the West, despite Serbia’s EU candidate status. Moreover, Serbia has refrained from imposing sanctions against Russia in response to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, and it appears unlikely to change this stance. This policy not only aligns Serbia closely with Moscow but also allows Russian state media outlets, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, to keep broadcasting in Serbia. As a result, Russian narratives continue to shape public opinion and bolster pro-Russian sentiments, giving Russia a unique foothold in the region.

Alongside unique historical contexts that continue to shape relations with Russia, Serbia, Moldova, and Georgia share another common thread: a persistent division between pro-Western and pro-Russian factions – a divide Russia is always quick and eager to exploit. All three nations aspire to deepen their ties with the West and hold EU candidate status. Yet this Western alignment poses a direct challenge to Putin, who famously described the collapse of the USSR as “the greatest political catastrophe of the century” and has since aimed to maintain Moscow’s influence over former Soviet territories.

Serbia, however, holds special strategic significance for Putin, as sustaining influence there, grants Russia leverage across much of the post-Yugoslav region. Consequently, Putin’s malign interferences in these three countries have frequently targeted pro-EU sentiment, seeking to weaken public support for Western integration. In both Moldova and Georgia this is particularly evident in election campaigns, while in Serbia it had a negative impact on perceptions towards EU accession.

In Moldova, Maia Sandu, a pro-EU candidate, secured a victory in the presidential election with 55% of the vote. However, she was defeated domestically by her pro-Russian rival, Stoianoglo, who received 51% of the vote within the country. Sandu’s ultimate success was largely due to the overwhelming support from the Moldovan diaspora, 83% of whom backed her – notably, these voters were less likely to be swayed by Russian disinformation campaigns. Similarly, Moldova narrowly avoided a setback in its European integration ambitions, with just 50.4% of the population backing the EU in a closely contested referendum.

Unsurprisingly, there were numerous reports of Russian interference in Moldova’s elections through disinformation campaigns, staged crises, and selective narrative framing. It was discovered that illegal voter transfers from Transnistria and the organised transportation of Moldovan voters from Russia were taking place, with video evidence pointing to coordinated efforts to mobilise these voters.

Additionally, Moldova’s foreign ministry reported false bomb threats at polling stations in Frankfurt, Germany, and in the UK, including in Liverpool and Northampton, which appeared to be deliberate attempts to disrupt the vote and sow confusion.

Opposition parties in Moldova also leveraged rhetoric calling for Russian protection, portraying EU integration as a threat to national sovereignty. These tactics aimed not only to manipulate the election outcome but also to undermine confidence in Moldova’s democratic processes. Nevertheless, despite Moscow’s intense efforts, Moldova still continues to uphold its commitment to pursuing EU integration.

But recent events show just how dangerously close Russia came to turning the tide. Moldova’s public administration remains weak, with a lack of legal protection for officials and unresolved identity issues, which have slowed the country’s progress towards EU membership. These internal challenges make Moldova more vulnerable to Russian influence, stalling its European and independent aspirations to decide alliances.

The situation in Georgia is even more concerning – as Russia continues to disseminate its disinformation across the country, but also, has control over the key political parties. Georgia’s once-promising drive for EU membership, which was sparked by Russia’s 2008 invasion, has largely stalled.

The pro-Russian Georgian Dream party, founded in 2012 by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili – dubbed ‘the man who bought a country’ for his control over 25% of Georgia’s GDP – has played a central role in this shift. Ivanishvili made his fortune in Russia, and his wealth remains closely tied to Moscow, influencing the party’s stance and its policies.

Over the past decade, Georgian Dream has steadily reversed the country’s EU aspirations, passing controversial laws such as the ‘foreign agent’ bill and anti-LGBTQ measures, which have sparked protests across Tbilisi. Earlier this year, Georgia’s EU membership bid was effectively paused due to growing concerns over a decline in human rights and increasing repression. In response, the United States took a firmer stance, imposing sanctions on Georgian Dream politicians and police officers responsible for the repression and violence against protesters.

In contrast to Moldova’s EU ambitions, Georgia’s ruling party framed alignment with Russia as the only means of avoiding the kind of Western-led disaster seen in Ukraine, using the campaign slogan, “Say no to war! Choose peace!” This narrative was reinforced by graphic images of Ukrainian cities ravaged by Russian bombs, aiming to depict Russia as a stabilising force in the region.

The election itself became a textbook example of how democratic processes can be eroded, casting serious doubts on whether the vote could truly be considered free. Despite challenges to the election results, one hard truth remains: Russia has effectively won the battleground in Georgia. Even if the opposition succeeds in questioning the legitimacy of the vote, the delay in addressing these issues, along with widespread fears of Russian aggression, has already taken hold of the public’s consciousness.

In Serbia, Russian influence remains strong, with Putin’s regime viewed positively by many.

This sentiment is partly rooted in Russia’s refusal to recognise Kosovo’s independence but is also heavily influenced by the pervasive presence of Russian media and narratives within the country. Consequently, even if the Serbian government wanted to reduce ties with Russia, it would face significant public resistance.

Since, February 2022, Serbia has been navigating what is often referred to as ‘the balancing act’ under President Vucic. Despite being an EU candidate state and officially committed to joining the bloc, Serbia has refused to impose sanctions on Russia. High-ranking government officials regularly meet with Putin and other Russian leaders, underscoring the strong ties between the two nations. Serbia’s population remains largely pro-Russian, and the continued presence of Russian state media outlets, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, plays a critical role in promoting Moscow’s agenda. As Reporters Without Borders puts it: “Russian narratives are packaged for local audiences before being distributed across the region” through these media channels.”

The influence of Russian propaganda is further evident in the growing strain in relations with the West, with some experts predicting that, if a referendum on EU membership were held tomorrow, only 43% of Serbs would support joining the EU.

Meanwhile, Serbia continues to engage with EU officials, with visits from high-ranking leaders such as the German Chancellor and the French President earlier in the year. Despite two years of efforts, however, the EU and other Western allies have struggled to persuade the Serbian government to distance itself from Russia. More critically, they have yet to make significant inroads in shifting Serbian public opinion away from Russia and towards the West.

Moldova, Georgia, and Serbia each demonstrate the powerful sway Russia can hold over public sentiment, gaining substantial political leverage in these countries. While Georgia’s EU path has stalled and Moldova and Serbia face significant pressures, the situation is not beyond repair. However, Russia’s ability to exploit political divisions and manipulate public opinion cannot be underestimated. The deeper we look into the situation, the clearer it becomes that Russia’s actions have systematically shaped perceptions, creating a fertile ground for its influence to take root.

To protect democratic alliances and values, it is essential to recognise the depth of Russia’s influence and to address its interference with proactive, effective strategies that strengthen resilience and foster informed, independent public opinion in these nations. Furthermore, it is crucial for the West to independently reconsider its strategy towards these countries. Research indicates that the decline in support for the West is not solely due to admiration for Putin or Russian interference but is also rooted in independently-held negative perceptions of the West.

Therefore, the West must prioritize efforts to win the hearts and minds of people in the regions where it aims to sustain its influence.

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