2026 could be decisive for the future of Europe’s hypersonic shield

As Russia once again challenges the West by deploying hypersonic missiles against Kyiv while brandishing nuclear threats, the time may have come for Europe to make a political and industrial choice that could determine whether, in the 2030s, it will be capable of defending itself autonomously against the proliferation of hypersonic threats.

In May, Russia carried out major nuclear exercises involving its strategic missile forces, while the war in Ukraine continues to provide a concrete demonstration of the use of hypersonic weapons under real combat conditions. Kyiv was notably targeted, with Moscow acknowledging that the Ukrainian capital had been struck by several missiles — including Iskander, Kinzhal and Zircon systems — during the night of May 24.

The repeated use of the Russian Kinzhal and Zircon missiles has reinforced a reality that European defence officials can no longer ignore: Europe currently possesses no operational system capable of reliably intercepting manoeuvring hypersonic threats. However, work on this issue has been underway for several years, and 2026 is set to mark a decisive milestone.

An industrial battle of significant consequence

The European capability requirement was first validated in 2019 under the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project TWISTER (Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based Theatre Surveillance), which aimed to provide Europe with the ability to detect and intercept emerging missile threats, including hypersonic weapons.

In response, the European Commission launched a competitive call for proposals under the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2021, known as EATMI (Endo-Atmospheric Interceptor), specifically focused on the interceptor itself, including the propulsion system and kill vehicle. Two industrial consortia submitted bids. The first, EU-HYDEF (European Hypersonic Defence Interceptor), initially brought together 12 companies from five countries under the leadership of the Spanish consortium SMS and Germany’s Diehl Defence. The second, HYDIS (Hypersonic Defence Interceptor Study), was coordinated by MBDA France and initially assembled 19 companies from four countries.

in July 2022, the Commission selected EU-HYDEF as the winning proposal. However, following the surprise and criticism generated by that decision, the Commission awarded a similar contract only a few months later to the unsuccessful consortium, citing the urgency created by Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine. Both programmes were subsequently placed under the management of OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement), the multinational organisation responsible for facilitating and managing cooperative European defence procurement programmes. The respective contracts entered into force on 31 October 2023 for EU-HYDEF and 15 May 2024 for HYDIS2.

As a result, Europe has since been pursuing two hypersonic interceptor programmes in parallel with support from the European Defence Fund. EU-HYDEF received €100 million in EDF funding, complemented by €10m in national contributions from participating states, while HYDIS2 received €80m from the EDF and approximately €60m in additional national funding.

The year 2026 is expected to prove decisive. Before end of the year, the European Commission is due to select a single follow-on EDF project according to the call worth €100 million that was launched on 25 December. The selected consortium will have the responsibility to pave the way for what is intended to become Europe’s future operational hypersonic interceptor programme.

A double choice for Europe

Officially, the EU-HYDEF consortium is coordinated by SMS (Sistemas de Misiles de España), a Spanish grouping that remains relatively inexperienced in managing large-scale defence programmes. SMS brings together four Spanish companies: SENER Aeroespacial (aerospace engineering), Escribano (mechanical engineering), GMV (navigation and guidance systems), and INSTALAZA (munitions). In practice, however, the programme’s principal technical contractor is Germany’s Diehl Defence, which alone receives €34.6 million of the €99 million in European funding allocated to project partners, making it by far the largest individual beneficiary of the programme. By comparison, SMS receives €6.8 million. Other major contributors include Nammo of Norway (€16.3 million, propulsion systems), Belgium’s SONACA (€7.6 million, aerodynamic structures), Spain’s GMV (€4 million, GNSS guidance technologies), and Poland’s Łukasiewicz Research Network (€5.7 million, research and development).

The decision to grant separate EDF support to MBDA France’s bid was widely interpreted within the defence sector as an effort to politically rebalance the industrial landscape. The programme, officially designated HYDIS2 when its contract with OCCAR entered into force in 2024, is led by MBDA France, Europe’s largest missile manufacturer. Within HYDIS2, MBDA coordinates a broad network of European contributors covering propulsion, sensors, aerodynamic modelling and guidance technologies, while acting as the overall system integrator. Key participants include MBDA Italia (€16.8 million), Bayern-Chemie of Germany (€11.1 million, solid-fuel propulsion), Italy’s AVIO SpA (€5.7 million, propulsion systems), France’s Lynred (€2.4 million, infrared sensors), ArianeGroup (€1.8 million, high-performance propulsion), and ONERA (€2 million, aerodynamic research), alongside around 30 subcontractors spread across 14 European countries.

Technological prowess

For reasons of confidentiality, linked both to the highly sensitive nature of these technologies, whose details are coveted by competitors and allies alike, and to the ongoing industrial competition between the two programmes, very little is known about the concrete progress achieved by either consortium or the technical and operational solutions they are developing.

Publicly available information is largely limited to milestone announcements published by OCCAR or the contractors themselves. EU-HYDEF completed its Concept Selection Review in August 2025 and is expected to undergo a Preliminary Requirements Review in the summer of 2026. Diehl Defence has even suggested that an operational capability could be fielded as early as 2029, significantly and surprisingly ahead of the timeline originally envisaged by European planners in their new call requirements.

Nevertheless, both programmes remain at relatively early stages of development with Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) near 3. EU-HYDEF is generally assessed as being less mature than HYDIS2 which is believed to be progressing between TRL 3 and 5. In practical terms, neither programme is currently close to delivering an operational hypersonic interceptor. MBDA has, however, some initial momentum through the anticipation work conducted before 2024 on its Aquila concept and its background in the antiballistic field with the ASTER B1NT, giving it a somewhat more mature technological base from which to proceed.

European sovereignty

Regardless of the respective progress achieved by the two programmes, the European Commission's decision in 2026 will be a decisive one. The stakes extend far beyond industrial competition, as the selected project could form the basis of Europe's future ability to defend itself against hypersonic threats. At present, no European country possesses an indigenous capability to reliably intercept such weapons, making the forthcoming choice a matter of strategic importance for the continent as a whole.

The importance and the urgency of the challenge was recently underlined by European Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, who described missile defence systems as "the biggest shortcoming" of the European Union, arguing that Europe must rapidly develop autonomous production capacities and overcome the fragmentation of its defence industry if it is to address emerging missile threats.

The Commission's 2026 decision will reveal whether Europe is prepared to prioritise operational effectiveness, industrial consolidation and genuine strategic sovereignty by setting aside national sensitivities at a time when both Russia and China have already deployed manoeuvrable hypersonic weapons, while Europe remains years away from an operational response.

The programme ultimately selected should therefore be the one that offers the strongest military solution: the highest probability of intercepting the hypersonic threats likely to emerge over the next 10 to 15 years, the greatest capacity for future upgrades as those threats evolve, the best interception performance, and the closest integration with the detection and tracking architecture envisaged under the broader TWISTER framework.

Equally important will be the ability to move rapidly from development to production. Europe's requirements will be substantial, and the chosen consortium should be the one best positioned to industrialise its solution at scale, integrate diverse technological contributions efficiently, and draw on the strongest capabilities available across the European defence and aerospace sector.

All of this must be achieved within a framework of genuine European sovereignty. For a capability as strategic as hypersonic missile defence, one that could ultimately play a role in managing escalation and reinforcing deterrence, Europe cannot afford dependencies that might later constrain supply chains, operational freedom, or technological control. "Air defence missiles and anti-ballistic missiles are currently the biggest shortfall, [..] that’s why we need independent missile production in Europe", summarized Andrius Kubilius in 2025. This means not only developing an ITAR-free solution, but also ensuring European ownership of system design, critical technologies and the key information underpinning the capability.

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