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#Russia: How modern is Russian Czar Vladimir #Putin?

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Vladimir Putin, as expected, has been approved for his fourth term as a president of Russia. During 18 years of his rule he has not only failed to modernize his country, he established a system that is in fact a partly modernized czarism, writes Yuriy Sheyko, Brussels and Germany-based journalist with a PhD in Political Science.

One may quite often find Vladimir Putin being called a czar of Russia, not just a president. The sheer numbers provide a good reason for it, as he has ruled over his country for more than 18 years. On 18 March, he was approved for a fourth term in office after an election, the outcome of which was clear to everyone beforehand.

However, this is not only about the numbers, incompatible with presidency in any democratic country. This is also about some key elements of czarism being characteristic for Putin's rule. It is clear that contemporary Russia differs very much from Russian empire 150 or 200 years ago. Nevertheless, despite all the differences and all those modern appearances of Putin, he is not only a czar, but in many aspects, not really a modernized one.

In czarism, same as in oriental despotism, a czar is not just a ruler, not the first among equals, not just a human being elevated to the highest position in state. There is a fundamental difference between a czar and all the others. There are no in-betweens; all those who matter, do matter only by the grace of czar. In Russian empire a monarch has been giving land to those whom he or she ennobled for a good service. Nowadays land is no more a major source of wealth, business is. In Russia it is mainly the access to the natural resources or to government procurement.

Nowadays it works differently. There are no ceremonies, where Putin grants a certain company to a certain oligarch. He has just let a system to be established. A system, in which some oligarchs and officials have at their disposal wealth far greater than they could have in a free competition. To get a glimpse of opulence, it would suffice to watch an investigative movie by the opposition politician Alexey Navalny Don't Call Him Dimon. There he attributes several palaces, vineyards, and yachts to the prime minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev. Rotenberg brothers or Yury Kovalchuk, old acquaintances of Putin, are now billionaries. If all that wealth has its source in their entrepreneurship or statesmanship prowess, is for everyone to judge. Company of Arkady Rotenberg, for example, is building a bridge to Crimea, illegally annexed by Russia in 2014. Russian journalists estimated this project to cost at least $5 bln.

In Russia one can not only acquire much very fast, one can lose everything, depending on the grace of Putin. The last example is a former Russian minister of economic development Alexey Ulyukaev who was sentenced to eight years, based mainly on the testimony of Igor Sechin, the CEO of state oil company Rosneft. The best example of a downfall that may happen to an oligarch in Russia, is Mikhail Khodorkovsky, once one of the richest men in the country. In 2003 he was arrested and stripped of his oil and gas company Yukos.

The differences from real czarism are that in a contemporary system far fewer people receive favours from Putin, they may also lose them easier, as the whole process is more arbitrary and unofficial, and luxury today is far greater. Not much of modernization there.

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During the elections, Putin's goal was to clearly demonstrate a chasm separating him and all the others in the country. And he succeeded in achieving it, albeit probably not spectacularly by the standards of current Russia. According to the Central electoral commission of Russia, Putin received more than 76% of votes with the turnout higher than 67% - both numbers better than six years ago.

Putin acts according to his role. He doesn't recognize any of the other seven candidates as his contenders. That's why he wasn't conducting any real election campaign, he didn't have an election program, and he refused to participate in debates with other candidates, as it would have put him on the same footing with them. Participation in a campaign and debates for a president shows his ability to explain and defend his policies; a czar would just lose his grandeur in such a way.

The popular support that Putin enjoys, is a modern thing; although no one knows the real support due to the absence of free elections. Czars didn't have any need to maintain their public image. But even in this regard Putin makes use of some old tricks. There is a saying in Russia "The czar is good, the boyars are bad". The role of boyars (hereditary aristocracy) now is being played by bureaucracy. Putin uses this trick on a constant basis, claiming all the successes for himself and directing public discontent mostly at local officials, as if he hasn't been a head of state or government for more than 18 years. "There should everything be removed that allows unscrupulous and corrupted representatives of authorities and law enforcement to put pressure on business", - said Putin in his last keynote speech. Nevertheless, this trick works just fine thanks to the mentioned saying that seems to be rooted in Russian mentality.

Economically contemporary Russia lives off its natural resources, similarly to the Russian empire. The structure has clearly changed and nowadays energy sources are of the highest importance, but the principle remains the same. According to the Russian ministry of finances, in 2017 the revenues of the federal budget were financed for 39.6% with oil and gas. The country was industrialized during the Soviet era, but almost the sole industrial sector where Russia maintains a relatively high competitiveness, is arms industry and industries associated with it, like space launches.

Maintaining both strong armed and police forces was a priority for Kremlin practically throughout the whole its history. The last year the Russian government spent more than 17% of the budget expenditures for defense purposes and almost 12% - for security and police. Together that amounted to the same sum as all the welfare expenditures. At the same time no one knows, how advanced Putin's "invincible" weapons are in reality, especially taking into account sanctions, prohibiting transfers of defense technologies to Russia.

Vladimir Putin succeeded in constructing a twofold image. On one hand he consolidated his position, where no one inside of Russia can challenge him. On the other hand, he is seen as someone really close to the people. All the images of Putin shirtless riding a horse, fishing, participating in judo bouts, and even flying on a microlight with birds, or exploring a shipwreck with a submarine convey an image of a strongman, a real man (muzhik) who is very well understandable for most people in Russia. Even this is not something fundamentally new, as, for example, the emperor Peter I worked on a shipyard and a leader of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev had an image of a simple man.

To conclude, Putin has not modernized Russian economy, maintains not a modern system of servitude, and his modernization of armed forces is not a modern, but quite a traditional thing for Russia. So, despite all the appearances, he is not a very modernized czar.

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