NSS 2014: Ukraine's nuclear gamble

By Anna van Densky, The Hague

The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in The Hague, 24-25 March, devoted to the worldwide safety of nuclear materials, was totally overshadowed by future relations between the West and Russia. The long-awaited meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his newly appointed Ukrainian counterpart Andrii Deshchytsia taking place on the margins of the conference did not bring crisis relief. The pictures taken showed two men remote from each other and gloomy - no handshakes, no family photos, not the slightest hope of breaking the ice.

The general mood of depression was amplified by the absence of translators for Lavrov's press conference – the Dutch hosts engaged in unprecedented security measures surrounding President Obama, and did not provide for translation from Russian: although shown on giant screens, the minister was understood by Russian speakers only.

Apparently, the failure to provide translation was a systemic error at the NSS, as it did not occur to the hosts to translate the key address by incumbent South Korean President Park Geun-hye – the international press corps at the conference hall and all those following the online streaming were equally deprived of translation. Moreover, the organizers did not inform their guests that they weren't providing translations, otherwise both the South Korean and Russian could have addressed the world's audiences in fluent English.

As a result, the intense debates between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations did not reach the world community.  However, in the aftermath of the conference, documents appeared on different official sites to confirm the profound gap between the positions on Crimea. The Russians insisted that there was a coup d’état in Kiev, liberating them from the obligation to respect the Budapest memorandum; they insisted on this as being the ultimate reason for the splitting up of the Ukrainian state. In the framework of the conference, Minister Lavrov confirmed the fulfillment of the obligation towards Ukraine in the delivery of nuclear fuel and removal of waste.

The position of the new Ukranian leaders on nuclear policy remains confused: on the eve of the NSS conference, a number of politicians from the ruling coalition of ‘Batkivshina’ and ‘Udar’ put forward an initiative to abandon the Non-proliferation Treaty  signed after the collapse of the USSR.

This move was received with the greatest concern by the other ex-Soviet Republic, Kazakhstan, which abandoned  the world’s fourth nuclear arsenal  and has since done its utmost to promote the ideals of nuclear disarmament.

The Ukraine's interest in quitting the Non-proliferation Treaty did not evoke any reaction by the West, which is overwhelmed in wrestling with Russia over Ukraine. Sadly, these declarations match the previous calls by Maidan Square leaders to start blowing up Russian gas pipelines. The hectic and volatile policies of Ukraine's new leaders are stuck in a stalemate with Russia, the West in foreign policy and their domestic opponents - Ukraine's ways and means are becoming increasingly adventurous, threatening to become a huge area of instability for years to come.

The tragedy of Chernobyl happened because of technical negligence - errors of political negligence are potentially no less dramatic.

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