I hate to admit it, but Trump is right about Ukraine

Before I proceed, I owe a disclosure to the readers of EU Reporter. If I were a US citizen, I would not have voted for President Donald Trump because, leaving aside the fact that he is a convicted felon and, as a human being he is a rude and graceless person, there are many elements in his domestic agenda that I do not like, writes Vidya S. Sharma Ph.d.

I am not totally opposed to it but I am also not a great fan of the transactional style of diplomacy on international front. Especially by a superpower. Wealthier and more powerful nations need to act seemingly altruistically (though ultimately, it enhances their soft power). For instance, I am not in favour of Musk-Trump decision to defund nearly all USAID programmes, stop US financial contribution the World Health Organization, treat environmental laws as hindrances to economic development, or try to do away with programmes designed to reduce the impact of greenhouse gases, etc.

In a democracy, it is normal to criticise/discredit the opposition’s policies in the market of ideas, ie, to prove one’s attractiveness to the voters. But Trump’s preferred modus operandi is to abuse, belittle and insult his opponents and perceived enemies by publicly calling names.

After a heated argument on February 28, 2025, how President Trump ordered President Zelensky to leave the White House must be condemned in the strongest terms. One does not treat a visiting Head of State as if he/she were a junior clerk in one’s company. One needs to follow protocols set out for such occasions.

Trump has been rightly criticised for calling President Volodymyr Zelensky a dictator. But Trump may have said so out of ignorance and not to insult Zelensky. Trump may not have known that the Ukrainian Constitution forbids parliamentary and presidential elections to be held if the country is under martial law.

Similarly, Ukraine may not have started this war as wrongfully claimed by President Trump but, as I discuss below a strong case can be made that it were Ukraine’s naivety and failure (due to inexperience) in crafting a foreign policy solely suited to serve Ukraine’s national interests that has largely contributed, at least, in prolonging this war.

For the reasons enumerated in my article, 'How Kamala Harris lost the unlosable election' published here on November 15, 2024, I also would have not voted for Kamala Harris. During her four years as Vice President or during the 2024 presidential campaign, Harris did not show any intellectual or policy depth on challenges facing the US domestically or internationally. She could not even utter a coherent sentence on any issue unless it was beamed to her on her teleprinter.

Advertisement

The readers of EU Reporter will know that President Trump and his administration have been widely pilloried for trying to negotiate a peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine. His proposal rules out NATO membership to Ukraine at the outset and requires Ukraine to cede sovereignty over the areas already under Russian control.

The purpose of this article is to examine if the above criticism of Trump’s proposal is fair. Is Trump guilty of appeasing Russia? Is he the Neville Chamberlain of 2025, as Robert Kagan, a contributing writer for The Atlantic and a senior fellow at the prestigious Brookings Institution, has asserted?

TRUMP’S CRITICISM – HOW FAIR?

One would expect left-leaning liberal commentators to pummel Trump. But conservative commentators, who were loudly barracking for Trump when he was running for re-election, have been castigating Trump since he indicated about four weeks ago that Russia should be readmitted to G7; and his Defence Secretary, Pete Hegseth, on 12 February 2025 on his first visit to NATO headquarters stated that (a) Ukraine should not expect to recover all of the territory captured by Russia since 2014; and (b) the US would not support Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership.

President Trump has been criticised for singing from Putin’s hymn sheet. When Trump tweeted that Zelensky’s policies had led to the Russia-Ukraine War, Tony Abbott, Australia’s most conservative ex-Prime Minister, declaimed that Trump was “living in fantasy land”. He also berated Trump when the latter said that the Zelensky administration had misused billions of dollars provided in US aid.

Paul Monk, a former senior intelligence analyst with The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and a staunch Trump supporter, declared Trump’s political agenda “isn’t just disruptive — it’s destructive.”

Steven Pifer, ex-U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and one of the more vocal members of a large pro-Ukraine and anti-Russia lobby in the US, has written against Trump on such online media platforms as The Hill and The National Interest for agreeing to Putin’s demands even before the start of the negotiations. In other words, Trump surrendered any leverage that the US may have in influencing the shape of peace settlement.

Writing in The Washington Post, Michael Birnbaum et.al. wrote, “Trump has alarmed Europe by appearing to make significant concessions to Russian President Vladimir Putin even before formal negotiations start... Worried Europeans said Trump was handing Russia their strongest bargaining chip before it could be used.”

The Wall Street Journal editorialized on February 17, 2025: “European allies knew their relationship with the second Trump Administration would be challenging. Even so, the shocks they’ve received from Washington in recent days constitute a crisis. The warning, more or less: Shape up or the Americans are shipping out.

“Start with the Ukraine war. This is the largest military conflict on European soil since 1945, and the Continent’s leaders recognise the stakes for their security. But Mr. Trump’s message is that the US doesn’t care what Europeans think about how the war should be resolved.”

Commenting about Trump’s policy of bringing the Ukraine-Russia war to a quick conclusion, Paul Kelly and many other opinion writers have concluded that the US cannot be relied on as a partner. Malcolm Turnbull, ex-Prime Minister of Australia, made the same accusation in an interview on ABC.

Paul Dibb, a Russia hawk and former Deputy Secretary in the Australian Department of Defence, rebuked Donald Trump by saying that “no negotiating tactic can justify the abandonment of Zelensky and Ukraine in peace negotiations”. Another Ukraine lobbyist and now a Professor of Russian History at the Melbourne University called Trump Putin’s puppet. Many commentators have also expounded that Trump has diminished the US.

By the way, these are the same category of commentators who, soon after the start of the Ukraine-Russia War were making such predictions as: Russia’s economy is at the verge of collapse (in fact, according to the figures compiled by the Bank of Finland, it grew by 3.6% and 3.6% to 4.1% in 2023 and 2024 respectively); the war is so unpopular in Russia that Putin would be soon overthrown; the morale of the Russian army is so low that Russian soldiers are deserting their posts. The latter is not a serious problem facing Russia. It is, however, as US Vice President J D Vance rightly pointed out to Zelensky, is one of the biggest problems faced by Ukraine: thousands of Ukrainian men have abandoned their posts, blaming poor conditions on the front lines and open-ended service, etc.

BIDEN’S UKRAINE DOCTRINE

One way to assess the validity of Trump’s criticism would be to determine how materially Trump’s position differs from the Biden doctrine.

A close analysis shows that their above criticism of Trump is based on two assumptions:

• Biden was eager to invite Ukraine as the newest member of NATO; and
• Biden would have demanded that Russia give up territories won during the war as part of any peace settlement.

These assumptions are not supported by the facts.

It is true that Biden repeatedly said that the US will support Ukraine “for as long as it takes”. But he never clarified: As long as it takes to do what?

When Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive failed, the White House formulated a new Ukraine strategy that de-emphasized the recapture of lost territory to Russia. The new strategy has three main aims: (a) to help Ukraine not to lose any more territory to Russia; (b) to keep NATO allies united in their support of Ukraine; and (c) to avoid NATO getting directly involved in the conflict.

Karen DeYoung of The Washington Post, along with three of her colleagues, after talking to several senior officials in the Biden Administration, Ukrainian politicians and military personnel, and senior politicians in NATO member countries, wrote a well-researched article entitled, “U.S. war plans for Ukraine don’t foresee retaking lost territory”.

Among the NATO members, Poland and the Balkan states have been the most strident supporters of Ukraine. After the failed Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive, Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics told The Washington Post, “Most probably there are not going to be huge territorial gains...The only strategy is to get as much as you can to Ukraine to help them first of all to defend their own cities ... and second to help them simply not to lose ground.”

When the Biden Administration was developing its Ukraine policy after the latter’s failed counteroffensive in 2023, Eric Green was serving on Biden’s National Security Council overseeing Russia policy. In an interview with Simon Shuster of Time, Green said, “We were deliberately not talking about the territorial parameters”. In other words, the revised US policy did not envisage a promise to help Ukraine recover any land already lost to Russia.

Eric Green told Shuster, “The reason was simple... in the White House’s view, doing so was beyond Ukraine’s ability, even with robust help from the West.” Green went on to say, “That was not going to be a success story ultimately. The more important objective was for Ukraine to survive as a sovereign, democratic country.”

After the failed counteroffensive of 2023, President Volodymyr Zelensky developed a “victory plan”. This plan comprised three components: (a) immediate NATO membership to Ukraine; (b) the US must strengthen Ukraine’s position with a massive new influx of weapons; and (c) Ukraine be allowed to hit deep into Russia.

As mentioned above, Biden, on the other hand, had three different aims which contradicted with Zelensky’s objectives.

It was not Biden alone who was against Ukraine’s membership to NATO. Germany, Hungary and Slovakia were also against inviting Ukraine to join NATO.

One senior NATO official is reported to have said, “Countries like Belgium, Slovenia or Spain are hiding behind the U.S. and Germany. They are reluctant.”

In late October 2024, outgoing U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told POLITICO: “The alliance has not, to date, reached the point where it is prepared to offer membership or an invitation to Ukraine.”

Biden’s Foreign Secretary, Anthony Blinken in an interview in January, 2024 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, said, “We can see what Ukraine’s future can and should be, irrespective of exactly where lines are drawn...and that’s a future where it stands strongly on its own two feet militarily, economically, democratically.” (italics are mine)

After Donald Trump was declared the winner of the 2024 election, Zelensky did not hesitate to criticise Biden openly. In an interview with Lex Fridman (podcast aired in January this year), President Volodymyr Zelensky said, “I don’t want the same situation like we had with Biden. I ask for sanctions now, please, and weapons now.”

Zelensky thinks that Biden was too cautious in standing up to Russia, especially when it comes to granting Ukraine a clear path to NATO membership. In one of his interviews during his visit to the Biden White House last September, Zelensky said, “It is very important that we share the same vision for Ukraine’s security future – in the E.U. and NATO.”

UKRAINE: BIDEN VS. TRUMP

It must be clear from the above discussion that the Biden Administration was not keen for Ukraine to join NATO. Nor did Biden ever promise Ukraine any assistance in regaining the lost territory.

So what did Biden mean when he often said, “for as long as it takes.” It could only have meant that Biden would support Ukraine as long as Ukraine was willing to fight Russia alone as a mercenary country armed and financed by the US and NATO.

Biden knew that the Ukraine-Russia conflict required a political solution. Biden knew that if Russia allowed Ukraine to join NATO, then it would be completely encircled by NATO on its eastern border. Biden knew that for Russia it was an existential war. Biden knew that he was using Ukraine in his great power game.

This is why Biden never engaged with Russia on this issue. His engagements were confined to getting released American citizens/journalists held as prisoners in Russian jails. Biden was happy to use Ukraine as fodder by deluding it that NATO and EU membership were not far away and the buckets of money that would flow by joining the EU were within their grasp.

Biden was against US or NATO soldiers fighting on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine wants NATO membership desperately so that it could invoke the Article 5 of the treaty which states that if a NATO country is the victim of an armed attack, each Alliance member will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take such measures as it deems necessary, "including the use of armed force," to come to the aid of the attacked country.

However, Biden had known all along that granting NATO membership to Ukraine was a sure way to engulf the entire European continent in a very destructive war. This may force Russia to use tactical nuclear weapons to defend itself against the collective might of European NATO members and the US. This is what Trump was referring to when he accused President Zelensky of wanting to start “World War III.”

Until the very public bust-up between Presidents Trump and Zelensky at their last meeting at the White House, Trump was following Biden’s policy. Or, it would be fair to say that Biden followed the policy set out by the Trump I administration.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BIDEN AND TRUMP

Is Trump’s policy materially different from Biden doctrine? The honest answer has to be NO.

But it differs in presentation and unlike Biden it seeks a political resolution of the problem.

Where Trump differs from Biden is that he and his Defence Secretary Hegseth are prepared to openly say what the Biden Administration would only say privately in closed door meetings to its NATO allies, ie, (a) NATO membership was not an option for Ukraine; and (b) and Ukraine, if it wanted an end to the war, then it will have to make territorial concessions. But Biden was not interested in reaching a political settlement about Russia’s legitimate security concerns. Against all available evidence, Biden hoped Russia would economically collapse and sue for peace.

Trump brought out these two latent features of Biden’s policy in public because he was re-elected with the mandate of ending the Ukraine-Russia War. Trump is not in favour of funding the war; it has now become a war of attrition where Ukraine knows that it cannot take back its lost territory by force.

Russia also knows that even if it succeeded in occupying Ukraine, it would face deadlier guerilla warfare and acts of sabotage than it ever encountered in Afghanistan. Some of these acts would certainly take place within Russia as the killing of the Russian general, Igor Kirillov (he was in charge of the country's nuclear protection forces) in front of his Moscow home in December last year showed. Ukraine is neither Afghanistan nor Chechnya. It shares borders with four NATO members.

It should be obvious by now that Trump was not making any concessions to Russia without getting anything in return. He was, in the Trumpian undiplomatic way, being more honest with the Ukrainian people. He was telling ordinary Ukrainians what peace with Russia entailed. Something that the Ukrainian political and military elite had been reluctant to tell their citizens. Biden, on the other hand, was not prepared to dismantle the web of illusion with which he misled ordinary Ukrainians.

Trump has merely injected reality into the situation. In other words, bringing one of the warring parties back to earth. If you like, softening them up.

If we wish to judge Trump on the basis of evidence alone and not let our prejudices distort our thinking, we would find it very difficult to criticise Trump’s policy when we compare it with the Biden doctrine. Trump is merely levelling up with the citizens of the US, Ukraine and US’s NATO allies

Trump is keen to end the war so that the financial resources presently spent supporting the Ukraine war could be employed domestically or repair US’s balance sheet.

However, his critics have failed to notice a crucial difference between Trump and all of his predecessors. All other past Presidents of the United States, in their relationships with allies, have kept their areas of disputes and agreements tightly compartmentalised. President Trump does not do that. To achieve his objective, Trump is prepared to spill the dispute to all aspects of the relationship with that particular country (-ies).

NEITHER PUTIN NOR TRUMP ARE THE REAL VILLAINS

Neither Trump nor Putin are the real villains. The real villains responsible for this war are those politicians and bureaucrats whose policies and actions led to the expansion of NATO and the way and in the circumstances they chose to carry out NATO's eastward expansion.

Professor Mary Sarotte’s book, “Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate,” has an excellent account of NATO’s eastward expansion.

Sarotte is an American historian of the post-Cold War era at Johns Hopkins University. Her book was recommended as one of the best books on foreign policy by Foreign Affairs in 2021 and listed as one of the Best Books to Read by the Financial Times in 2022.

Sarotte shows that Bill Clinton’s US Secretary of Defence William Perry and General John Shalikashvili proposed that the Partnership for Peace programme be extended to Russia to integrate the latter into European security architecture. Yeltsin was in favour of this integration. He wanted Russia to join such institutions as NATO, G7, the OECD, the WTO and the Paris Club, etc. He saw the proposed Partnership for Peace as the perfect vehicle to achieve this aim.

But the Perry and Shalikashvili initiative was immediately shot down by such Russian hawks as Madeleine Albright, Antony Lake, Richard Holbrooke, etc. Initially, Clinton favoured this integration; in the end, he let himself be guided by the Russian hawks. Clinton then gave the go-ahead to NATO to recruit former Warsaw pact countries. During 1995-99, the Clinton administration pursued NATO’s eastward expansion rather aggressively.

CLINTON KILLED THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN RUSSIA

NATO brought East and Central European countries into its orbit at a time when Russia was economically and politically on the nose. The rouble was losing value against the US dollar on a daily basis. Supermarket shelves in Moscow were empty. The Russian Government was unable to pay even pensions and other welfare benefits to its elderly citizens and war veterans on time.

Russia felt humiliated as it watched Eastern and Central European countries and the Baltic states being enticed to join NATO. It felt marginalised.

Sarotte quotes Odd Arne Westad (a Norwegian historian who teaches the contemporary history of Eastern Europe at Yale University) to summarise the situation. Westad wrote in his 2017 book, The Cold War: A World History: “the West should have dealt with Russia better after the Cold War than it did.

On 20 January 2006 in Budapest, the defence ministers of Central European NATO countries issued a joint communique, which stated that they were ready to support Ukraine's entry into NATO.

On 27 April 2006, at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, James Appathurai (who was representing the NATO Secretary General) stated that all members of the alliance are in favour of the speedy integration of Ukraine into NATO.

The U.S., in the euphoria of having won the Cold War, forgot that countries like Russia, China, and India, due to their sheer size and military capabilities, would always play a crucial role on the international stage. Their concerns cannot be ignored forever.

Internally within Russia, NATO’s eastward expansion fatally weakened pro-Western liberal movement and played in the hands of nationalist hardliners like Putin. Thus, the US mowed down at the base its own primary policy objective of strengthening civic institutions that would lead to a democratic Russia.

The Clinton White House was not only busy with the eastward expansion of NATO. In 1999, the latter launched a 78-day air campaign (called Operation Allied Force) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This operation came as a total shock to Russians because it was not approved by the UN.

At that time, Russia was too weak and under the ineffective leadership of Yeltsin (who was by this time very ill by all accounts). It found itself to be a helpless spectator.

The Operation Allied Force gave an additional reason to nationalists to oppose NATO, particularly its eastward movement. The nationalists’ slogan was "Today Belgrade, tomorrow Moscow.”

On the other hand, Russian nationalists do not take into account that the threat of nuclear proliferation posed by the collapse of the Soviet Union was also a contributory factor in the eastward expansion of NATO. But the US and its NATO allies were wrong to totally discount the views of people like Putin and roughshod over them. These people saw the break-up of the Soviet Union and the eastward expansion of NATO as an unmitigated disaster or catastrophe.

In summary, the US and NATO achieved what they set out to do, but they did not play its politics correctly. The US and its European allies showed a lack of strategic foresight in the execution of its policy. They were too eager to take advantage of an etiolated Russia. It is this mistake that has come to haunt them in the form of the Ukraine conflict.

TRUMP: A HONEST MEDIATOR

There is another attribute that differentiates Trump from the approach of the Biden Administration and most leaders of NATO countries toward Kyiv.

Trump is keen to end this war as soon as possible. So, unlike the US’s behaviour in other crises, Trump is presenting himself as a neutral mediator. He is neither pushing Ukraine’s agenda nor is he favouring Putin. At the same time, he is prepared to put whatever pressure he can muster on both warring parties to bring them to the negotiating table.

He had been widely reprimanded for saying that Ukraine, though it does not have any cards, yet is 'more difficult to deal with' than Russia. Trump says so for two reasons: (a) Ukrainian President Zelensky has repeatedly said that he wanted the US to "stand more firmly on our side", ie, not be an honest broker. He expressed the same sentiment during his acrimonious meeting with Trump on February 28.

Trump has faced criticism for asking Ukraine to sign away its mineral wealth to the US. Contrary to widely held belief, it was originally Zelensky’s idea, developed last year. Its purpose was to entice the US to sign the mineral exploration and production joint ventures. The money raised in this manner could then be used to fund Ukraine’s war effort. Ukraine also thought that the US would find this deal so attractive that Trump would be prepared to underwrite Ukraine’s security in case of a future war with Russia.

Before he visited the White House on February 28, referring to the possibility that the US may not offer a security guarantee, Zelensky said, “I’m not signing something that will have to be repaid by generations and generations of Ukrainians.”

Trump will not offer such a guarantee for two reasons: (a) it will compromise his position as a neutral umpire, and (b) Trump wants to resolve this conflict because he wants to extricate the US from this conflict. He thinks the conflict has erupted because European members of NATO have not been spending enough on their own security needs and have been free-riding the US.

He has already said several times that if Russia does not respond positively to his peace efforts, then he would impose much tougher economic sanctions on Russia.

CHINA IS THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

In 2021, after President Biden withdrew US troops from Afghanistan. Biden was criticised by both sides of politics. I was one of very few commentators who supported Biden’s decision. I also wrote a series of articles on the ‘war on terror’ for the EUReporter. In my article entitled “China was the biggest beneficiary of the 'forever' war in Afghanistan” that appeared here on September 21, 2021, I pointed out that China was the biggest beneficiary while the US was distracted fighting the ‘war on terror.’ Those years allowed China to modernise all three wings of its defence forces by increasing the size of its defence budget and by pilfering technology from the US and its allies. This process continued unabated during the Obama years not only because of Obama’s inexperience in foreign affairs but he failed to appreciate what these developments in China meant for the position of the US globally.

Further, during the Bush and Obama years, China quietly nurtured deep friendships amongst the South Pacific countries, in Africa and Latin America (including Panama) and economically vulnerable Greece (in Europe). China also continued to integrate the economies of the South Asian countries (ie, ASEAN) into its economy.

Obama did develop an East Asia Strategy, which during his second term was slightly modified and re-christened "Pivot to East Asia" regional strategy. It was supposed to represent a significant shift in the foreign policy of the United States and a break from the Bush Jr. era.

But in practical terms, it did not achieve much because the Obama administration was still tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan. And then it became entangled in the balakanization of Libya and Syria. Never has a more unworthy person been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize than Obama. Perhaps except Henry Kissinger.

It was left to the Trump I Administration to develop an effective China policy. Trump during his first term attempted to contain China in two ways (a) by trying to slow down its rate of economic growth by using tariffs (he was helped in his task by the Covid-19 pandemic) and (b) by hindering its technological growth by restricting technology transfer both at commercial level by not licensing Nvidia and other chip makers from selling certain types of chips to Chinese companies, restricting US academics from working as consultants in China, and preventing some Chinese academics from seeking positions in US academic institutions.

Though Biden followed Trump’s China policy, the way he pursued the Russia- Ukraine War, he undid most of the hard work that the first Trump administration did to contain China.

This is because Biden’s Ukraine policy, ie, his refusal to see the need to bring this conflict to a speedy resolution, ensured the closest possible cooperation between Russia and China at every imaginable level: economic, technological, and political. Biden became a prisoner of what he had learnt at the height of the Cold War, ie, the Soviet Union was an evil empire and it must be contained at all costs. He failed to appreciate the significance of the collapse of the USSR  in December 1991; now China was a much more formidable adversary, and that time was not on the side of the US. His personal dislike of Putin also played a role in it.

Biden’s insistence on seeing Russia with his Cold War telescope and his refusal to acknowledge Russia’s legitimate security concerns have accelerated the deterioration of the security environment that the US faces now. His policy forced Russia to form an anti-US alliance not only with China, but also with North Korea and Iran.

In February 2022, Russia and China signed a "no limits" partnership agreement on political, economic, and military cooperation. On May 16, last year, this cooperation was further strengthened when the two countries pledged a "new era" of partnership solely aimed against the United States.

Similarly, on 9 November 2024, Putin signed the North Korea- Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty into law, and Kim Jong Un signed a decree to ratify the same on 11 November 2024.

The readers may recall that when President Obama negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran on 14 July 2015, an agreement to put breaks on the Iranian nuclear program in return for the lifting of some economic sanctions, Russia played a crucial role.

It should not be difficult for any reader to figure out whether Biden’s policy has strengthened China, Iran and North Korea or weakened them.

It would be wrong to interpret President Trump’s desire to bring an end to the Ukraine war as cozying up with ruthless dictator Putin because Trump himself has an authoritarian streak in him.

Instead, Trump sees the resolution of the Ukraine - Russia War as a necessary precondition to contain China. He believes by helping Putin to end the war (which has reached a stalemate) on terms where Putin can claim a face-saving victory and by inviting Russia back to G7 club, he has a fighting chance to create a wedge between China and Russia or at least slow down the cooperation between China and Russia, especially in defence technology.

NEGOTIATING TABLE: ABSENCE OF EUROPEAN ALLIES AND UKRAINE

Trump has also been widely reproached for not including Ukraine and any of its European allies in his negotiating team. Their exclusion has been used to question his deal-making ability.

This is even though both Trump and his Foreign Secretary, Marco Rubio, have said that as and when it is appropriate, Ukraine and European countries will be briefed, their input sought, and considered. The fact is that Rubio and Trump’s National Security Advisor, Michael Waltz, met for 8 hours with the Ukrainian delegation in Jeddah on March 11 (soon after the rancorous meeting between Zelensky and Trump) speaks volumes both about the Trump administration’s sincerity and Trump's desire to serve as an honest broker. The Trump Administration II must also be lauded for having steadfastly stuck to its strategy in the face of a very vocal and mammoth Ukraine lobby within the US and Europe.

Two more points briefly about Trump’s strategy.

First, though it is true that Ukraine is one of the warring parties and has suffered massive damage to its physical assets, eg, military facilities, roads, bridges, hospitals, residential blocks, etc., and lost many thousands of its soldiers along with 20-25% of its territory, yet the hard reality is that Ukraine was Biden’s proxy. It was and remains a war of choice for Ukraine.

In 2022, Türkiye brokered an agreement between Russia and Ukraine. The terms of that agreement were far more favourable to Ukraine than any ceasefire agreement it would now sign with Russia. We now know Biden sent Victoria Nuland to Kyiv to scuttle the agreement and encouraged Ukraine to fight with Russia. Without the financial and military support (in terms of weapon systems and intelligence sharing) from the US, Ukraine cannot fight with Russia for more than a few months, even if its European allies supported Ukraine to their maximum capacity. This is because of capacity and capability constraints that all European NATO members face.

It means that the only two parties whose opinions matter in this conflict are the US and Russia. European allies of the US and Ukraine are legitimate parties to this conflict. But they do not have the resources to impose their will unless they can persuade the US to launch a full-scale invasion of Russia. The best they can hope for is to present their respective cases to the US and hope their concerns will be taken into account.

Second, it is well-documented that the more parties on the negotiating table, the longer it takes to find a resolution.

THREAT TO RULES-BASED ORDER

Russia’s attempt to occupy four easternmost Ukrainian provinces (oblasts) has been decried as a threat to the rules-based order that the West has attempted to establish since World War II. In fact, neither side has clean hands.

Very briefly, I merely mention three of many instances where the West has not adhered to its own rules-based order: (a) as mentioned above the US and NATO never sought the UN’s approval for their 78-days relentless air-bombardment of Serbia; (b) the invasion of Iraq by President Bush Jr. under false pretences of getting rid of “weapons of mass destruction” was never authorised by the UN; and (c) Biden’s unflinching support of Israel while the latter violated most rules of engagement in conflict zones by killing hundreds of civilians every day in the Gaza Strip and used starvation and bombing of hospitals and other civilian infrastructure and residential buildings, etc. as tools of war. I hasten to add here that I condemn in the strongest terms what Hamas did on October 7, 2023. That was a despicable act which Hamas would have known in advance that it would hurt Palestinians. Yet, the fact remains that Israel’s response committed many unlawful acts every day and its response was grossly disproportionate as has been its programme to settle Jews in Palestine over the last 5 decades or so (with the tacit support of the US).

Similarly, what Russia did in Georgia in 2008 and its occupation of Transdniestrian region of Moldova in 2022 were against the rules-based order.

THE UKRAINE-RUSSIA WAR: HOW IT MAY END

Since President Trump’s re-election, things have been moving rapidly on this front. Leaving aside his public bust-up with Zelensky, Trump has discussed this issue with British PM Starmer and French President Macron. He is reported to have had several telephone conversations with Putin. His advisers, led by Rubio, have had discussions with advisers of both Zelensky and Putin. He had also spoken with several European allies and Canada.

Out of Rubio’s meeting with the Ukrainian team emerged a ceasefire proposal. Steve Witkoff, Trump’s close friend and real estate magnate who played a key role in negotiating a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, had now been dispatched to Moscow to seek Putin’s response on this proposal.

Russians are well-experienced in negotiating with the US. Further, Putin and Trump know each other well. After perusing the proposal, followed by his discussions with Witkoff, it would not be difficult for Putin and his advisors to figure out what may be the American/Ukrainian bottom line. Putin is bound to take the proposal seriously, but he will also try to modify it to suit his war aims. He is not going to sign on the dotted lines.

Two of his aims have already seemed to have been achieved (at least partially): Ukraine has been denied NATO membership for the time being. But Putin would want Ukraine to state unambiguously that it will never join NATO and remain a neutral country. I do not think Putin would object to Ukraine's seeking EU membership.

Trump’s ceasefire proposal is silent about the territory captured by Russia. Before Putin agrees to the ceasefire, he would need a clear undertaking by the US and Ukraine that the lost four eastern provinces (oblasts) must be recognised as new provinces of Russia..

Since 2022, the US and its allies of Ukraine have imposed at least 21,692 sanctions on Russia. They are aimed at Russian nationals, media organizations, the military sector, and on companies active in energy, aviation, shipbuilding, telecommunications, etc. Before he signs on any ceasefire deal, Putin would want a firm time frame for most of these sanctions to be lifted. The same goes for the assets belonging to the Russian Central Bank that have been seized by the West.

To further weaken Ukraine’s bargaining position, Putin will try to stretch out ceasefire negotiations until the Russian troops have driven out the last Ukrainian soldier from the Kursk region.

It is in the interest of Ukraine to settle its differences with Russia as soon as possible because time is on Russia’s side. If the present indications are anything to go by, then the more Ukraine delays in reaching an agreement with Russia, the more territory it will lose. Zelensky criticised Biden as being too cautious, but no US leader will allow this war to escalate into full-scale European war. In other words, the West may be willing to provide arms and missiles to Ukraine, but they will all be provided with strict conditions so as not to provoke Russia any further. The West shows Russia has shown a lot of restraint in this conflict.

No one knows whether Trump will succeed in bringing peace to Ukraine-Russia border. But I will conclude by stating that whenever the war comes to an end it will be settled on terms more to Russia’s liking than Ukraine. And it will be left to Ukrainians to debate whether this war was worth fighting.

Both sides will have to make compromises. Though momentum is on Putin’s side, yet the most difficult thing Putin will have to negotiate is the composition of peace-keeping troops, what will be their mandate, and under what flag they will operate in Ukraine. Similarly, the most difficult thing for Zelensky would be ceding sovereignty over part of Ukraine. Zelensky could use his promise of neutrality as a bargaining chip on this score.

Vidya S. Sharma advises clients on country risks and technology-based joint ventures. He has contributed numerous articles for such prestigious newspapers as: The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age (Melbourne), The Australian Financial Review, The Economic Times (India), The Business Standard (India), EU Reporter (Brussels), East Asia Forum (Canberra), The Business Line (Chennai, India), The Hindustan Times (India), The Financial Express (India), The Daily Caller (US. He can be contacted at: [email protected].

Share this article: