The ambition behind Iran’s involvement in Sudan

Iran’s reported provision of arms to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is seen as having been crucial in allowing the SAF to recapture the capital Khartoum.

Some, including leading news organizations such as Bloomberg  (https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-sudan-civil-war/?embedded-checkout=true) have described how the SAF now has so many weapons from Iran, they had to build a new hangar at the Port Sudan airport to house them all.

It begs the question: what are the weapons that Iran is supplying to the SAF, and what is their motivation for providing the hardware that is causing such suffering and loss of life in this war torn country?

The BBC  (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2vvjz652j1o) reported in June 2024 on Iranian drones at a military site near Khartoum, explaining that Iran had sent Ababil-3 and Mohajer-6 drones, the same kind that Iran is reported to have supplied to groups in Iraq, Venezuala and Russia. The BBC went on to report on video evidence of an army drone shot down by the Rapid Support Forces.

The BBC, in the same article, said their source, Wim Zwijnenburg, a drone expert and head of the Humanitarian Disarmament Project at Dutch peace organization PAX, explained that the wreckage, engine, and tail resembled an Iranian-manufactured drone called Mohajer-6, which is 6.5m long, can fly up to 2,000 km (1,240 miles) and deliver strikes with guided freefall munitions.

The highly respected Sudan Conflict Observatory, funded by the US State Department, closely monitors activities in the region.

A statement on its site says the United States and its partners continue “intense” diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Sudan, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and support the aspirations of the Sudanese people for a civilian government and is “monitoring the activities of the warring parties.”

It has reportedly found evidence of at least seven military cargo flights delivering weapons from airports in Iran to Port Sudan, the wartime “headquarters” of the SAF. Two other flights are considered by the Conflict Observatory to be “very likely” deliveries because the planes turned off their transponders just before landing in Sudan. The Conflict Observatory is said to have tracked Iranian flights between December 2023 and July 25, 2024. Such aircraft are few and far between, making it easy to identify and the same aeroplane was reportedly used previously to deliver weapons to Iranian-backed fighters in Syria.

“Since flights began in December 2023, there has been an increase in Iranian weapons identified on the battlefield,” the Conflict Observatory report said, noting an Iranian-made Mohajer-6 drone reportedly shot down in Khartoum, a Mohajer-6 drone and ground control station, a single-payload drone similar to Iranian variants used in Yemen and a large volume of Iranian artillery guns and munitions.

In an article dated October 15, 2024 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/15/sudan-war-weapons-uae-iran) The Washington Post said: “Since the end of last year, Sudan’s military has also been using foreign-supplied armed drones, in particular those secretly provided by Iran, according to the Observatory.”

Iran’s motivation for supplying weapons to the SAF appears clear. Their longstanding goal to secure a foothold in the Red Sea has only felt more essential to Iran since their proxies in the region – Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza – have been weakened in recent years as a result of Israeli military action. Many believe that the Red Sea’s importance, both in terms of global security as well as economic power as a shipping route, is behind Iran’s desire for a naval base in Sudan.

An October 2024 Washington Post article stated, “The UAE and Iran, as well as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Russia, have followed developments with keen interest because of Sudan’s strategic location on the Red Sea, which sees about 12 percent of world shipping.”

International media claim that Iran has already demonstrated its will and ability to disrupt Red Sea shipping. The reported attacks on ships by the Houthis, another Iranian proxy, forced a diversion to the Cape of Good Hope, adding a fortnight to journeys.

One close, Brussels-based observer of events in the region said, “There is no question Iran fully understands the economic and security headache it can cause using the Red Sea and it seeks more of that power. Tehran is hopeful that its support for the SAF will eventually deliver that all important Red Sea naval base for them, despite the SAF leader Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seeming to have raised and then dashed Iran’s hopes on this.”

Of course Iran is not alone in supplying weapons to the SAF. In March 2025, the Washington Post published a report into Turkey’s alleged supply of weapons to the SAF.

This apparent quest by Iran for influence in the Red Sea and a naval base in Sudan is a primary driver of the brutal conflict in Sudan, and the drones it supplies are, it has been claimed, behind the appalling civilian casualties being caused by SAF forces.

All the time a devastating civil war rages on in this poverty-stricken country.

Other conflicts, such as the terrible war in Ukraine, seem to hog the headlines but the international community, including the EU, would do well to watch what is also happening in Sudan.

No one from the Iran government was immediately available for comment.

Further info

https://mars.gmu.edu/bitstreams/76be7cf0-4b11-49e7-a61b-47d460e146b4/download
https://2021-2025.state.gov/public-launch-of-sudan-conflict-observatory-monitoring-platform

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