#Lithuania finds ways to maintain its energy

Recent political events have once again highlighted the political relevance of the energy security issue for Lithuania. We must pay tribute to the government that has struggled to reduce Lithuania's dependence on Russian energy supplies and to receive financial support from its EU and NATO partners. The country is finding new ways to attract international attention to the problem, writes Adomas Abromaitis.

The energy security issue for Lithuania has various aspects. One of them is insufficient funds for the dismantling work at Lithuania's Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP). According to Audrius Kamienas, director of the Activity Planning and Finance Department at the INPP, another €900 million will be required, starting in 2020. The government is continuing negotiations with the EU in order to receive further financing for the project.

Deputy Energy Minister Rokas Baliukovas said that active negotiations on additional EU funding for the Ignalina plant closure would start in 2017 to 2018. Kamienas said that €941m had been used for the INPP closure by the start of 2016, with another €745m in EU and national budget funds planned to be used by 2020. Self-financing of the project is impossible for the country and even partial funding has become an unbearable burden for the national budget.

President Dalia Grybauskaite expects that Germany will support Lithuania in its efforts to raise concerns over the safety of Belarus's nuclear power plant, which is under construction in Astravyets, some 50 kilometres from Vilnius. Belarus is the closest ally of Russia - the Lithuanian government is not sure of the plant's safety but cannot oppose the construction alone, so Lithuanian authorities are following a proven method by appealing for external help.

Another aspect of maintaining Lithuanian energy security that the government is considering is preventing construction of the Russian-German pipeline project Nord Stream 2. Being dependent on Russian energy supplies in the long term, Lithuanian authorities believe that it poses "risks for energy security not only to the country but to the region of Central and Eastern Europe as a whole".

Earlier, on 17 March, prime ministers and leaders of nine member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia) had sent a letter to European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, speaking out against Nord Stream 2. But the EU is not directly involved in the decision-making process around Nord Stream 2: it is the national permitting authorities of the countries whose waters the pipeline will cross that must grant approval for the project. In this case, these are the permitting authorities of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on 20 April and tried to convince her of the project's inefficiency.

However, if the German companies are able to defend their commercial interests, then the project will have a future. Taking into account the German pragmatism, economic expediency may well prevail over the political - Germany does not pay so much attention to Russia's threat as the Baltic States do.

It should be said that Lithuanian authorities are effectively using the geopolitical situation in the region in order to reach national goals by attracting international attention and persuading partners that Lithuanian problems are their problems as well. "Threat from the West" made it possible for Lithuanian authorities to ask for NATO support in military and energy security spheres.

The seventh meeting of the Steering Committee of Vilnius-based NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (NATO ENSEC COE) took place on 19-20 April in Chalon-sur-Saône, France.

In the meeting, much attention was dedicated to the protection of critical energy infrastructure and discussions on expansion of the NATO Energy Centre. NATO has assessed that the protection of critical energy infrastructure is one of the key elements for strengthening the Alliance's resilience to hybrid threats. In this regard, Lithuania called for increased funding for the Centre's activities in order to ensure the necessary expertise in the field of protection of critical energy infrastructure. New countries joining the Centre (such as Germany and the US) will strengthen the capabilities of the structure and will make Lithuania more prominent in NATO and the international arena.

So, the event allowed for receiving additional political and financial support from external sources, such as NATO.

Thus, Lithuania today has at least two reliable ways of getting support in maintaining its energy security - from the EU and NATO. It should be said that Vilnius is using such opportunities to reach national goals successfully.