The European Union and Kazakhstan, privileged partners in Eurasia?

The five states that form Central Asia, namely Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, have welcomed the opportunity to strengthen their influence in light of a strategic position underlined by the Afghan crisis. Kazakhstan in particular can play a more important role, given its diplomatic position, enhanced by an effective approach to mediation and its indirect neighbourhood. On 22 November, the 17th Central Asia–European Union Ministerial Conference on Foreign Affairs was held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

Extended influence beyond the Central Asian region

What might at first glance seem like yet another co-operation meeting between the European Union (EU) and a neighbouring region unveils an underlying desire for these landlocked states to establish their strategic and multilateral position, but also an opportunity for the EU to extend its reach more firmly to the heart of the Asian continent. In this respect, one should remember that Kazakhstan has launched a UN initiative to federate the 42 landlocked states or countries around the world, deprived of coastal access. This meeting between European foreign diplomacy, represented by the Vice-President of the European Commission and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, and Jutta Urpilainen, European Commissioner for International Partnerships, and the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) was an opportunity to unveil a new set of strategic cooperation plans for the region. This surge of inter-regional solidarity reveals a strong new bilateral axis between the EU and Central Asia, for which Kazakhstan, under the presidency of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has become a committed and appreciated spokesperson in recent years.

The Dushanbe agreements especially will demonstrate the value in providing strategic EU support to Afghanistan's neighbours. Finnish Commissioner Jutta Urpilainen thus presented the EU's €1 billion aid program for Afghanistan to the five representatives of the Central Asian republics, which are celebrating their 30th anniversary this year. Almost half of this budget is earmarked for neighbouring countries affected by the crisis caused by the recent Taliban takeover. Participants also pledged to intensify cooperation between the EU and Central Asia in areas such as the tackling of terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, and migrant smuggling.

They expressed the common hope to strengthen EU and Central Asia collaboration on border management. This obviously comes against the backdrop of rising tensions between Belarus and Poland following the mass arrival of immigrants from the Middle East. No wonder, then, that Josep Borrell stated in Dushanbe that he hoped the ties between the EU and the five Central Asian countries would intensify further in the future. Closer ties Paradoxically, the Afghan crisis is an opportunity for the EU to expand its influence in an area favoured by the Kremlin's policies and the economic ambitions of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

"Some might say that the EU is too far away from Central Asia to be relevant for the region […] no, it is quite the opposite", said Josep Borrell at the end of the conference, adding: "We are very happy to be here […] with a strong message that the EU is a reliable partner that you can count on in the long run". Already in June 2019, the EU adopted a 'New Strategy for Central Asia', which emphasised the growing importance of the region in the eyes of the EU by establishing strategic investment and cooperation agreements. This new approach to the "second circle" of our neighbourhood (in addition to the Eastern Partnership, around the Black Sea and in the South Caucasus) was further strengthened last September with the objective of the "Global Gateway", presented by European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, during her State of the Union speech, in order to strengthen the EU's interconnection with the rest of the world.

The EU has many interests in this area, which is – both geographically and politically – a natural corridor between Europe and Asia, at the heart of Eurasia, funnelling substantial quantities of energy resources, and a strong potential market (the five countries have a population of 70 million, 35% of whom are under 15 years old). This is why last week European diplomats presented to their Central Asian counterparts a plan for the future EU Global Gateway initiative, taking into account European ambitions around this global portal of the EU. It is a strategy worth more than €40 billion, to be dedicated to technology and infrastructure considered by many, and rightly so, as a materialisation of this European quest for influence in Central Asia.

It is perceived in many regards as a response to the new Silk Roads, following the example of the One Belt, One Road launched in November 2013 in the presence of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and then Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in Astana, and which has since become known as the Belt and Road Initiative. The Afghan situation is worsening as winter sets in, and the Taliban prove incapable of managing the country and protecting Afghans But European interests are also, and above all, intrinsically linked to the context of the last few months in Afghanistan and the disastrous fallout from the permanent installation of the Taliban regime on 15 August, following the precipitous and chaotic withdrawal of American troops.

As early as 2020, Afghans were the third most numerous nationality under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the precipitous withdrawal of Western troops has only aggravated this disastrous human situation. The Afghan crisis thus paradoxically seals the deal between the Central Asian bloc led by a Kazakh government keen on multilateral agreements and the EU, whose members are afraid of being overtaken by a new migratory crisis (but unfortunately provoke it indirectly by maintaining strict economic sanctions against the Taliban). With the regional primacy of the US gone as a result of the debacle in Afghanistan, almost-allies Russia and China now find themselves in direct competition for dominance in Central Asia - with Russia dominating the strategic landscape, even if China remains economically paramount. Pakistan and Iran, moreover, have been linked to China for decades.

One example of this influence is the Lion-Dragon deal, sealed in March 2021, between Tehran and Beijing, to the tune of $400bn for the next 25 years. The same is true of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), linking Islamabad and Beijing within the framework of the BRI project, allowing China to benefit from access to the Indian Ocean via the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the shores of the Indian Ocean, enabling China to "bypass" India and to justify an Indo-Pacific agenda. It was for this very reason that China had long asked Pakistan and Myanmar not to join the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IOAR), which was set up at New Delhi's initiative in 1997. But the EU is still a major economic partner for Central Asia, and is even Kazakhstan's main trading partner, accounting for 40% of the country's trade balance.

This approach comprising of strategic investments and "humanitarian" aid, which in reality allows the EU to contain the migratory flows from the Middle East, coupled with the multiplication of cooperation initiatives in terms of economic development, security, education, and culture, can guarantee the EU gets a new place of choice between Russia and China. Looking to the West…but for how long?

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