EU
A chance to turn page in #Montenegro
As one of Europe’s youngest countries, on October 16 Montenegro will be holding just its fourth parliamentary elections since declaring independence from Serbia in 2006. Seventeen parties and coalitions, including the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) led by Milo Đukanović (pictured), will be competing for the 81 seats in Montenegro’s parliament. While Đukanović is running for what would be his eighth term as prime minister, the outcome of the poll is truly up in the air: surveys show the opposition could win a parliamentary majority and unseat Đukanović, who has alternated between the presidency and the premiership almost uninterrupted since 1991, writes Colin Stevens.
This potential transfer of power has been made possible by the breakup of the ruling coalition, which formerly included the DPS and the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro (SDP). With much of the population dissatisfied with the growth of organized crime, corruption, and the deteriorating economic situation, the coalition broke apart earlier this year.
Đukanović’s ruling DPS is heading into the elections under the slogan 'Montenegro in NATO and the EU', playing off an emotional argument that suggests that the Montenegrins have to choose between a “European future” and a “Balkan dead-end”. The face of that "European future,” however, is the same man who once saw Slobodan Milosevic as a mentor, ordered the shelling of Dubrovnik in Croatia, and has only now transformed himself into a Western ally after 25 years in power.
According to the European Commission’s most recent Eurobarometer survey of public opinion in Montenegro, Đukanović’s chances of holding on to power look increasingly dicey. 69% of Montenegrins see the economy as performing badly, and half do not trust the sitting government and parliament. Only 35% of the respondents replied in the affirmative when asked “whether Montenegro is heading in the right direction.” Disconcertingly, almost half of the respondents could not say they “trusted in the EU.”
The survey also points to failures of the European Union’s policy toward the country. While Montenegro is often seen as the “poster child” of EU enlargement, its entry into the Union (slated for 2020 at the earliest) hinges on passing a laundry list of reforms, including tackling high-level corruption, reigning in budget deficit, and strengthening the justice system. Accession negotiations have already covered some of the chapters, but the vast majority remain open. Unfortunately, even this supposed progress only exists on paper and in the reports of European politicians.
In reality, one cursory look over Đukanović’s extensive rap sheet paints a clearer picture than all the reports of the European Union. In the mid-2000s, an Italian anti-mafia unit investigated the Montenegrin leader and his cohorts over a billion-dollar cigarette smuggling racket with the Italian Sacra Corona Unita and Camorra crime families. Đukanović leveraged his diplomatic immunity to evade prosecution, and the Italian authorities dropped the charges in 2009.
Đukanović also took advantage of Montenegro’s emerging telecom industry to enrich him and his family; the politician-cum-oligarch was involved in the Hungarian company Magyar Telecom bribery scheme in 2011, where his sister, Ana Kolarevic, reportedly helped to acquire Montenegro’s state-owned carrier, Crnogorski Telekom. The US Justice Department and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated Magyar and parent Deutsche Telekom, and the companies had to pay almost $95 million in criminal penalties. Specifically, Magyar Telecom admitted to bribing two government officials as well as Mr. Đukanović’s sister.
In 2010 PricewaterhouseCoopers also investigated the country's Prva Banka (First Bank), controlled by the Đukanović family. The audits found most of the money deposited at the bank came from public funds, while two thirds of the loans with no interest went to the Đukanovićs and their close associates, including Stanko Subotic (indicted by the Italian anti-mafia unit) and convicted drug smuggler Darko Saric. Weapons smuggling throughout the Balkans, with Montenegro as an epicenter, is an even graver concern, especially considering many of the weapons used in last year’s terrorist attacks in France came from the former Yugoslavia.
Clearly, Đukanović and his family control the financial levers in Montenegro. Journalists who delve into the corrupt affairs linked to the family and Montenegro’s powerful organized crime networks run serious risks. The secret services were allegedly tied to the 2004 murder of Dusko Jovanovic, editor-in-chief of opposition newspaper Dan, for exposing Đukanović’s criminal activity and fraud. Subsequent violent attacks on Montenegrin journalists who are trying to bring transparency to Montenegro are the norm.
The economic picture under Đukanović’s leadership is also growing bleak. Foreign debt rose from zero to 70% of GDP in just 10 years and the youth unemployment rate has ballooned to over 40%. The majority of large manufacturers have closed, and international courts are considering suits filed by foreign investors who incurred damages. The international rating agencies have little optimism to spare about the Montenegrin economy either.
So, who is competing to clean up after Đukanović?
The main Democratic Front opposition coalition is running under the slogan of 'MilliOn' (us or him),and has managed to unite once-irreconcilable political rivals around a common cause – ousting Đukanović. The parties of the Democratic Front were at the core of the popular protests that took over Podgorica last December, forcing Đukanović to call new elections. Alongside the Democratic Front, the Socialist People’s Party, DEMOS, and United Reform Action have also come together in the “Key Coalition,” a secondary opposition pact. Their coalition is posed for a more modest result, but they could play a major role in forming the next government.
With his corrupt tenure on shaky ground, it would be a mistake for the European Union to let Đukanović remain their sole interlocutor in Montenegro. With the opposition coalescing and public anger at boiling point, Brussels needs to maintain dialogue with all of Montenegro’s main political powers. If Đukanović is unseated after 16 October, Montenegro may finally move beyond serving as Đukanović’s “personal fiefdom” and become worthy of membership in Europe.
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