The EU is right to be cautious about recognising Juan Guaidó as #Venezuela’s president

January 23^rd was an extraordinary day in the history of Venezuela, capped off by opposition leader Juan Guaidó proclaiming himself the country’s legitimate president and taking the oath of office in front of cheering crowds of protestors. Even more astonishingly, the Trump administration quickly backed Guaidó’s claim—a nearly unprecedented step, as the U.S. typically refrains from endorsing individuals without effective control over their country.

After the U.S. set the tone, a number of other countries—from Brazil to Canada—recognised Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president pending free and fair elections to be held at a time undetermined. The divergent reactions to Guaidó’s proclamation fell along rough geographical lines: most of the Americas, with the notable exceptions of Mexico, Cuba and Bolivia, endorsed the opposition leader, while Russia and China continue to back Nicolas Maduro’s administration.

The EU has been more hesitant to stake out a bold position. European Council President Donald Tusk referred to the “democratic mandate” Guaidó enjoys; in a joint statement, the European bloc called for Guaidó’s civil rights to be respected but stopped well short of recognising him as President of Venezuela. By not taking the nuclear step of officially endorsing Guaidó’s claim to the presidency, European policymakers have proven wiser than their American counterparts.

An unorthodox move

Trump’s near-instantaneous recognition of Guaidó’s “administration” was a remarkable departure from normal foreign policy. Coming with a number of knock-on effects—from the fact that the U.S. would now be entitled to seize Venezuelan state assets and hand them over to Guaidó, to questions over the fate of Venezuelan diplomats at the United Nations—one Indiana University professor indicated that the recognition was legally “dicey”.

There is scant precedent for the United States recognizing an opposition figure as the genuine leader of a country. The Clinton administration continued to recognize Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide after he was ousted in a military coup, and the U.S. recognised the National Transitional Council as Libya’s “legitimate governing authority” in 2011. These cases, however, were different from the current situation in Venezuela in several key ways. In the first, the U.S. was merely continuing to support Haiti’s democratically-elected president who had been violently removed from office. In the second, Libya was in the middle of a civil war.

Though Venezuela is dealing with serious challenges—from hyperinflation to shortages of food and medicines—the country is not embroiled in an armed conflict. Nor was Maduro installed through a military coup—he won a fresh six-year term last May, though the country’s main opposition parties boycotted the vote and a number of nations, including the United States, refused to recognise the results of the election. Disavowing an elected government in a country at peace is a serious step which could set a dangerous precedent—one which EU policymakers, no matter their personal opinion of Maduro as a leader, may have wanted to circumvent by refraining from outright endorsing Guaidó.

President without power

By stopping short of declaring Guaidó the legitimate President of Venezuela, the EU has also avoided a Pandora’s box of legal and practical issues which the U.S. is now enmeshed in. The concerns which perturbed legal scholars when Washington decided to recognize the Libyan rebels are even more acute in the Venezuelan case. As former legal adviser to the State Department John Bellinger put it, “we are reluctant to recognize entities that do not control entire countries because then they are responsible for parts of the country that they don’t control”.

Guaidó—despite his swath of international endorsements and enthusiastic supporters—controls exactly zero Venezuelan territory. The self-declared interim president’s only real path to taking control of the country’s institutions lies with the Venezuelan army. To this effect, Guaidó has promised amnesty to any member of the military willing to turn on Maduro. His chances remain slim, as Maduro has taken extensive precautions to retain the army’s loyalty. Venezuelan Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino has already reaffirmed the military’s support for Maduro.

Embassy standoff

Recognising the legitimacy of a government which has little chance of actually coming to power provokes any number of problems, the most serious of which regards diplomats posted in the country. After the duelling presidents sent embassies conflicting instructions on Wednesday night—Maduro demanded that all American diplomatic personnel leave the country within 72 hours, while Guaidó requested that embassy staff remain—Venezuela and the U.S. are on a collision course for a perilous standoff.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has confirmed that, in line with Washington’s recognition of Guaidó, American personnel will not heed Maduro’s demand to leave by Saturday night. Allowing such open defiance of his dictates, however, would seem politically impossible for Maduro, as it would mean that he had lost all authority. One pro-Maduro lawmaker has already suggested that the administration could shut off utilities to the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. More dire predictions have suggested that an Iran-style hostage crisis could be imminent.

Courting calamity

Politically unable to deescalate the situation after having backed Guaidó, and with Guaidó practically unable to carry out the functions he has sworn to take on, the U.S. has turned its own diplomatic staff “into pawns in what is now an unpredictable international crisis”.

U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, who heavily lobbied Trump to recognise Guaidó, warned Wednesday that Maduro would incur “swift and severe consequences” if any U.S. diplomats were harmed. Such a situation might finally give Trump the green light to use U.S. military force to topple Maduro’s government, something he contemplated as early as August 2017—and something which would drag the U.S. into a prolonged conflict abroad and have devastating consequences on the Venezuelan people.

The EU was wise not to trap itself into a set of impossible choices by rushing to endorse Guaidó. The bloc must now seize the opportunity offered by its relative neutrality to mediate between the pro-Maduro and pro-Guaidó forces before their stubbornness leads to catastrophe.

Share this article: