Alex Cano activities have been sanctioned by the US

But he continues to be sheltered in Singapore. The United States sanctioned a company owned by Russian-born Singaporean citizen Alexandro David Cano Laskin, better known as Alex Cano. Last month, EU Reporter highlighted his case as an example of how Russian networks adapt to global pressure against the aggressor state. New findings now add further layers to the story—raising even more intriguing details and new questions.

Serniya FSB network

It was discovered that Alexsong Pte Ltd, a company registered in Singapore, was the first in that jurisdiction sanctioned by the US government immediately after the beginning of the Russian war against Ukraine. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Alexsong Pte Ltd pursuant to the Executive Order 14024 in March 2022 for having acted in interests of the government of Russia. In particular, Alexsong Pte Ltd facilitated transactions in support of sanctions evasion by the famous Russian Serniya network. Alexsong was among those designated for its involvement in providing Western technology to Russia's defence sector.

The company Alexsong Pte Ltd was quickly closed and its online footprint aggressively scrubbed; public records and corporate traces were removed to the point that the firm appears to have ceased to exist. Yet OSINT recovered references showing that Cano Laskin Alexandro David was recorded as the company’s owner from 18 September 2019 to 2 April 2022, and since 10 November 2021, he served as CEO. Before renaming to Alexsong Pte Ltd, obviously association with his current name, Alex, the entity operated as Champion Way Pte Ltd. As it was already described in previous investigations, changing names and identities is a part of a pattern used by Alex Cano.

The company was a part of a wider network of organizations involved into the Serniya network, which had been active since 2017 and was accused of illegally obtaining sensitive U.S. technologies and ammunition for Russia’s military. US Treasury called the Serniya network “instrumental to the Russian Federation’s war machine” evading U.S. and Western sanctions “to acquire sensitive military grade and dual-use technologies, including advanced semiconductors, for the Russian military, defence sector and research institutions.” VoA investigation linked Serniya network to Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, the successor agency to the Soviet KGB, and an article in social media linked Alex Cano to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. No proof of this particular link has been presented, and except for one, all the references on the Alex Cano link with Alexsong Pte Ltd disappeared. This goes along with other information about Alex Cano, who is suspected of changing names and identities of himself, his relatives and companies and cleaning internet records.

Life after sanctions? The same as before

Although Alexsong Pte Ltd was designated in March 2022, Alex Cano himself has not been individually sanctioned and — according to our findings — remained active, particularly in Singapore and, until recently, in Slovakia.

But while in Slovakia his activities phased out and he is not anymore visible there, in Singapore he flourishes. Alex Cano continues to present himself as a successful businessman and has used his Singapore citizenship to act as a local partner or intermediary for European firms seeking access to Asian markets. Victims report an easily recognisable pattern: formal introductions, short-lived cooperation, unpaid invoices and mounting debts, followed by disappearance or evasive behaviour. One victim, now pursuing legal action in Singapore, described the experience on condition of anonymity: “This is a top-level scam. You are introduced to a polished, well-connected Singaporean businessman. Then he disappears, and you realise you’ve been cheated. When you finally track him down, he hides behind his Singapore passport and a legal system that protects its citizens, even when the wrongdoing is obvious.” 

It is striking that, despite a company he owned being designated by OFAC, Cano has reportedly been able to continue operating in Singapore, obtain certificates of good conduct, and benefit from protections afforded to Singaporean citizens. New victims who fall into the same pattern are a direct consequence of the persistence of his activities in the jurisdiction. 

Cano’s case fits a broader pattern: frequent changes of names and corporate identities, and systematic removal of online records, that together make it difficult for victims, journalists, or regulators to assemble a comprehensive account of activities and liabilities. The rebranding from Champion Way Pte Ltd to Alexsong Pte Ltd — and the rapid deletion of records after the OFAC designation — illustrate how corporate mobility and data erasure are used to blunt the impact of sanctions.

The OFAC designation of Alexsong Pte Ltd demonstrates that Russian networks in Asia remain a threat. Yet the fact that an associated individual can continue to operate commercially in another jurisdiction underscores an enforcement gap: company-level sanctions do not automatically produce the same real-world constraints on associated private actors unless national authorities take complementary measures.

Time to act

Several urgent steps are needed. Singaporean authorities should reassess their policies on citizens linked to sanctioned entities. Holding a Singapore passport cannot be a shield for operating networks that undermine international security and defraud foreign businessmen. The EU and U.S. should expand coordination with Asian jurisdictions—including Singapore—on the enforcement of sanctions and monitoring of high-risk individuals. Information-sharing and joint investigations could prevent sanctioned actors from exploiting regulatory gaps.

Cano’s case demonstrates how quickly sanctioned individuals erase their digital footprint. Governments should invest more heavily in OSINT tracking, public registries, and mandatory corporate transparency measures to make it harder for sanctioned actors to disappear and re-emerge under new identities. Finally, victims of Cano’s schemes currently struggle to pursue justice. Singaporean regulators should explore mechanisms to ensure that sanctions violators cannot simultaneously operate scams that harm private citizens and businesses. Until these governance gaps are closed, Cano’s story will remain a cautionary tale of how international sanctions can be ignored by a single jurisdiction’s inaction.

EU reporter addressed Alex Cano with a list of questions, but to date, no response has been received.

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