Iran is running out of water and the regime is the cause

Iran is now facing the most severe water crisis in its modern history. Although drought and climate change have exacerbated the situation, the scale of the emergency is overwhelmingly man-made. It is the result of a political system that prioritises ideological control, patronage networks and regional militarism over the basic survival of its population. The water crisis is not just an environmental issue. Rather, it is the result of governance failure at the heart of the mullahs’ regime.

For decades, the authorities have celebrated the construction of dams, the diversion of canals, and large-scale agricultural expansion as symbols of national progress and revolutionary self-sufficiency. In reality, however, these projects were carried out with no regard for hydrological science or ecological balance. Instead, they served to bolster the political prestige and financial interests of a select few, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose engineering conglomerate, Khatam al-Anbiya, has become the dominant player in the country's water infrastructure.¹ These very same projects have now expedited the deterioration of Iran's rivers, lakes, aquifers, and farmland.

A systematic depletion of water reserves

Iran receives only about one-third of the global average annual rainfall.² Historically, this natural limitation was mitigated through careful management, including the ancient qanat system, which extracted groundwater sustainably without depleting its sources.³ This equilibrium was disrupted after 1979. Pro-natalist policies have driven population growth from 37 million in 1979 to over 90 million today,⁴ while the state has encouraged unrestricted groundwater extraction to support rapid agricultural and urban development. The number of licensed and unlicensed wells has risen to around one million, draining aquifers at a pace far exceeding natural replenishment. ⁵

The consequences are now irreversible in many regions. The Geological Survey of Iran has recorded land subsidence of up to 25 centimetres per year in parts of Tehran, Isfahan and Kerman.⁶ Once aquifers have collapsed and the land has compacted, it is impossible to restore them.

Dam-building and inter-basin transfers have exacerbated the situation. Water has been diverted from ecologically vulnerable basins to support politically favoured industries, including water-intensive steel and petrochemical production in arid provinces⁷. Lake Urmia, once the largest lake in the Middle East, has shrunk dramatically, exposing toxic salt flats that generate storms affecting millions⁸. Similarly, the Zayandeh-Rud river, which has sustained the economy and cultural identity of Isfahan for centuries, now runs dry for much of the year⁹.

Tehran at the edge of evacuation

By late 2025, the crisis had reached the capital itself. Tehran’s main reservoirs — Lar, Latyan, Taleghan and Amir Kabir — fell to their lowest recorded levels in six decades. ¹⁰ In November 2025, the regime’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian warned that authorities would be forced to evacuate the capital if rainfall did not improve.¹¹

Although officials publicly denied any plans for water rationing, residents reported nightly water cuts across central and southern districts, with utilities quietly reducing the water pressure to zero in order to refill local tanks.¹² Lower-income households, who were unable to afford rooftop storage, were disproportionately affected. This two-tier water economy mirrored broader inequality: wealth and political access determined who would endure the crisis and who would be abandoned to it.

The IRGC and the political economy of water

At the heart of the crisis lies the militarisation of resource management. For decades, Khatam al-Anbiya, the IRGC’s construction conglomerate, has dominated dam-building and river diversion, securing no-bid contracts worth billions.¹³ Rather than being shaped by environmental considerations, water policy has been influenced by networks of patronage and security control. The result is a system that many Iranian experts describe as a 'water mafia' — one in which political loyalty determines access to the nation’s most fundamental resource.

In the countryside, politically connected agribusinesses cultivate water-intensive crops such as sugar beet, pistachios and rice in regions where the water supply is not sustainable.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the government has failed to modernise irrigation systems, with more than 80 per cent of Iran’s agricultural water use still relying on inefficient flood irrigation.¹⁵

Rather than repairing leaking urban infrastructure, where up to 30 per cent of piped water is lost, funds have been diverted to nuclear development, ballistic missile programmes and proxy forces in the region.¹⁷ The regime’s strategic priorities could not be clearer: power first, citizens last.

Social consequences and rising public anger

The crisis has already fuelled unrest. In 2021, protests in Khuzestan began with chants of 'We are thirsty' and evolved into direct denunciations of the Supreme Leader.¹⁸ Similar demonstrations followed in Isfahan in 2021 and 2025. In July 2025, nightly protests erupted in Tehran and Eslamshahr amid simultaneous water and electricity outages.¹⁹ Videos showing chants against the entire ruling system, not just local officials, circulated widely on social media.

As shortages deepen, the perception that the crisis is inextricably linked to the nature of the regime is spreading. The connection between ecological collapse, corruption and political repression has become widely understood across Iranian society. People are not just angry about dry taps; they are angry about the system that produced them.

As this understanding spreads, national debates about alternatives have widened. Among organised opposition movements, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) has increasingly framed the water crisis as evidence that the existing state structure is irreformable. Its messaging links environmental collapse with the demand for a democratic, civilian-led system of governance capable of rebuilding national infrastructure on transparent and accountable foundations.

A crisis the regime cannot solve

There are technical solutions available to address the crisis: efficient irrigation systems, aquifer restoration, wastewater recycling, desalination, and transparent, basin-level water governance. However, to implement these measures, Iran would have to dismantle the political and economic structures that underpin the current system. It would require ending the IRGC’s control over water infrastructure; establishing transparent and decentralised management of resources; shutting down the politically protected illegal wells that have hollowed out aquifers; redirecting water away from regime-linked industries towards households, agriculture, and environmental recovery; and shifting state expenditure from military projects to the repair of basic national systems. These are not technical adjustments. They are political transformations. They directly contradict the core operating logic of the regime. For that reason, the state is structurally unable to resolve the crisis it has caused.

Conclusion: Water as a measure of legitimacy

Water has now become a measure of political legitimacy. A regime that is unable to keep its population hydrated cannot claim the right to govern. The drying up of reservoirs and rivers is mirrored by the erosion of public trust. The collapse of water security is no longer an abstract or distant threat; it is the lived reality of millions.

Iran is not just running out of water. It is running out of time.

Share this article: