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Germany’s #energy transition: a cautionary tale for Europe

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Germany has been hailed as a bold pioneer for its energy transition policy – or Energiewende in Berlin’s jargon – and particularly praised for its commitment to end nuclear power use altogether in the next five years. And yet, even though a “coal exit commission” is set to convene on 30 May to provide a road map for phasing out coal, Germany remains far too reliant on its extensive lignite reserves to power its economy and provide a backup for wind and solar power shortfalls.

For all the bravado, Germany’s Energiewende may be more cautionary tale than success story for other nations looking to modernize their energy sectors. At the heart of the policy lies a fundamental hypocrisy: despite Germany’s commitment to expanding its renewable energy capacity to replace lost nuclear plants, the country’s carbon emissions are currently on the rise.

The hasty decision to close all 19 nuclear power stations in Germany by 2022 was made in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima disaster, only a year after Chancellor Angela Merkel had decided to extend the plants’ lifespan. This policy reversal was coupled with plans to eliminate the use of fossil fuels by bringing renewables’ share of the German energy mix up to 60 percent by 2050.

Despite its seemingly sensible foundations, the Energiewende’s first years have revealed the problems the model poses for both Germany and the rest of Europe. Energiewende is hardly just a domestic issue: one of its basic tenets is that the country has nine neighbours with whom it can exchange power, either selling surplus energy when renewables overproduce or importing it from Austrian, Polish, French and Czech power stations when German renewables underperform.

While Germany has managed to bring renewables’ share of electricity generation up to 30 percent, the previous steady decline in carbon emissions – 27 percent from 1999 to 2009 – has sharply reversed since Germany decided to phase out nuclear. Instead of falling, emissions have instead risen by four percent in the years since. Why the worrying uptick in emissions? Because renewable energy is still inherently intermittent.

Barring major advances in battery and storage technology, Germany will be forced to retain other domestic energy sources for decades to come. If nuclear power is ruled out, coal plants will continue to run in their place and pollute the atmosphere in the process. Even worse, many thermal power plants in Germany burn lignite, a specific type of hard coal which emits more CO2 than almost any other fossil fuel. Whereas natural gas exudes between 150 and 430g of CO2 per kilowatt-hour, lignite clocks in at a staggering 1.1kg of CO2. Nuclear power only gives off  16g of CO2 per kilowatt-hour.

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These high emissions aren’t the only problem with Germany’s coal-fired baseload capacity. The coal plants aren’t agile enough to dial down output when conditions are optimal for renewable power generation. Thus, fluctuations in renewable supply cause an excess of power in a grid notoriously unable to handle sudden surges. Germany criminally neglected grid development for years while focusing on the flashier goal of expanding renewable capacity. The result? Crippling grid issues render the celebrated increase in renewable power generation almost meaningless.

These grid bottlenecks have serious knock-on effects for Germany’s neighbours. Since the country’s north-south power lines lack the capacity to carry energy from North Sea turbines into the country’s industrial heartland, so-called ‘power loop flows’ automatically divert electricity via neighbouring power grids. Typically, the Czech Republic and Poland bear the brunt of the overflow. They are now installing devices known as phase shifters to prevent widespread blackouts during surges.

Those phase shifters may not be enough to prevent grid disruption once the EU extends its electricity network to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The Baltic states have until now been integrated into a power grid operated by Russia under the 2001 BRELL agreement but hope to link up to the EU grid instead between 2020 and 2025. In keeping with their anti-nuclear slant, the Baltics hope to better enforce Lithuania’s ban on energy imports from Belarus’ nuclear power plant at Ostrovets by joining the EU’s power system.

The three countries plan to connect to Europe’s grid via a single link through Poland, which already suffers heavily from German power fluctuations. Unless the Baltic countries make significant investments to boost their base load capacities and alleviate supply problems, the Polish link will expose them to German power surges and put further pressure on the EU’s already-strained power distribution systems. The Baltics hope to accomplish this increase in reserve capabilities exclusively through renewables—a move which will only exacerbate the problem.

Ironically, this decision will also come with unexpected side-effects: higher CO2-emissions in the region. To offset the surges and added strain from the Baltics, Poland is expected to invest heavily in coal power for energy security reasons. Warsaw has already slowed renewables development and opened Europe’s largest coal plant in 2017 precisely for energy security considerations. The argument is likely to gain more prominence once the synchronisation is complete, undermining the EU’s climate targets.

The Baltics’ plan to exit BRELL thus presents a serious obstacle to the stability of the wider EU grid and CO2 reduction goals. To prevent its own objectives from getting undermined by overzealous activism, the EU could introduce a “Paris test” to check whether energy projects such as Baltic grid synchronisation actually lead to higher carbon emissions or not. Project support should be contingent on whether it is well thought-through and implemented carefully to ensure decarbonisation in the long-run.

But the chief lesson to be learned here is how relinquishing nuclear energy for political and ideological reasons is causing cascades of unforeseen problems –  be it the Energiewende or the BRELL exit. Their experience offers important warnings countries considering to quit nuclear would be wise to heed.

 

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